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McCRACKEN
THE USE AND ABUSE OF RELIGION

BUBER
PROPHECY, APOCALYPTIC AND THE HISTORICAL HOUR

HOLMER
KIERKEGAARD AND THEOLOGY

TULLY
RELIGION AND TEACHING

ACHTEMEIER
THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE CHURCH

BACHMAN, TANGEMAN, BROWNE
RELIGION AND THE ARTS

DEVANANDAN
MODERN HINDUISM AND CHRISTIAN EVANGELISM

IN MEMORIAM
JAMES EVERETT FRAME; LEWIS JOSEPH SHERRILL

BOOK REVIEWS

UNION SEMINARY QUARTERLY REVIEW

TO PROMOTE THOUGHT AND ACTION IN THE SERVICE OF CHRIST

VOLUME XII, NUMBER 3 MARCH 1957

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Editorial

Christian churches are involved in a self-examination which must issue in a re-expression of both the Church's reality and its task. This is a most significant, if minor, aspect of the contemporary 'return to' or 'upswing in' religion. "Community of Grace" is one of the more fruitful phrases used to probe what we mean by the Church. The danger in such a title, for all its validity, is that it too readily identifies the Church as the unique Community of Grace and too easily obscures the relationship of Grace to other communities. Grace is not a something special confined to our churches. It is a reality which cuts across the life of the world and it is a constituting factor in all individual and corporate existence. This term is appropriate for the Church insofar as it claims to identify properly what it knows it cannot manipulate.

Incursions of Grace enter our personal and social lives at many points. It is that to which we confess in retrospective appropriation and appreciation of our lives. We have not planned or coerced it. Grace is not a Christian possession insofar as that claim would imply exclusive ownership rights. It strikes individual lives on the battlefield or in the schoolroom and it learns social existence from oppressive factories to overbearing country clubs. Grace is the name for those points where transcendent order and immanent perfection lift up our fragmented lives and renew them. If God has called his churches to be Communities of Grace he has not at all promised to work through them alone.

A sobering concern for Christian ministers is that our churches' activities can easily become a something else to do in hectic and sometimes empty lives. Too few Communities of Grace are living centers of the individual and social life around them; they may rather reinforce self-concern and shallow contentment. That some churches harbor fanaticism and breed prejudice is all too clear, North as well as South. God's loving judgment and terrible redemption are not mediated through them to a broken world.

Such an indictment of our churches is heightened for us if we know explicitly secular communities where divisions of the spirit have vanished at times and where God's Grace, unknown as such, has taken up lives and renewed them. A curious phenomenon stamps the contemporary revival of interest in Christianity. Religiosity is developing on two levels. At the point of emotional attachment church affiliation is increasing rapidly and perhaps uncritically. Among the thoughtful, concern for Christianity is also proceeding—but often divorced from our churches.

We cannot come to terms with the world, or with God's reconciliation of the world to Himself, if we believe that our churches live wholly by Grace while other human communities are without it. The claim that the Gospel makes is that it is the Truth which indicates both heights and depths of life and interprets these reaches for what they are. As the Community of Grace the Church witnesses to the truth that all other communities as well live by the Grace which it confesses in Christ Jesus. This confession is to accept a task, a task in a world which does not know the Creator and Redeemer who gives to that world its very life.

J. F. W.

The Use and Abuse of Religion

Robert J. McCracken

Does Job fear God for nought?—Job 1:9

The Book of Job is one of the great literary masterpieces of the world. The theme of the book is the vindication of religion. The opening scene represents God as calling attention to His servant Job and commending the integrity of his character. Whereupon Satan, who fills the role of cynic, inquires with a sneer "Does Job fear God for nought?" The insinuation is unmistakable. To be sure, Job is a good man, but why? If he is pious it is for an obvious reason. He has found that it pays to be religious. When virtue is rewarded with prosperity who would not be virtuous? But, Satan proposes, withdraw the prosperity and see what happens; the piety will be shortlived.

Everybody knows the sequel. Job was put to the test. He suffered both in his person and in his estate. He lost his property, was assailed by his friends, taunted by his wife, bereft of his children and, as it seemed to him, forsaken by God. Yet in it all and through it all he held fast to his integrity. When his troubles were at their height he cried, "Though He slay me, yet will I trust Him." What a cry that is! It proves that religion is not always turned to as a utility, a paying proposition, a profitable investment yielding highly satisfactory returns.

I.

Satan's insinuation, however, ought not to be brushed aside as though there were no point to it. There are people who resort to religion because of what it can do for them and with little thought of anything to be done by them. The corruption of the best, said the Ancients, is productive of the worst. People can terribly abuse religion. Consider the situation Jesus encounted in Palestine as summarized by James S.

Stewart. The Pharisees *externalized* religion, made it a matter of outward observance, not of the heart. The Scribes *professionalized* religion they were dry-as-dust ecclesiastics, not saints with the fire of God in them. The Sadducees *secularized* religion, turned it to their own advantage, were at bottom skeptical and worldly. The Zealots *nationalized* religion, made it a means to one end, "Down with Rome and up with Palestine." It would be naive to suppose that this is all ancient history. I mention the Pharisees, Scribes, Sadducees, Zealots not to calumniate them but to point out that what they did is still being done. There is a constant temptation to treat religion as a utility, to make it serve our own ends, personal, professional, national.

In Barrie's play *The Twelve Pound Look* there is a scene where a husband and wife are at the breaking point. This is what the wife says to her husband: "Harry, you don't even know what your religion was and is and will be till the day of your expensive funeral. One's religion is whatever he is most interested in, and yours is Success. I couldn't endure it. If a failure had come now and then—but your success was suffocating me . . . I clung to you to save myself, but I had to let you go; you had only the one quality, Harry, success; you had it so strong that it swallowed up all the others." Plain speaking that, and the accuracy of it as diagnosis we all recognize, for the type is familiar. A man may be a churchman, professing belief in God and Christ and goodness, and yet may make his religion serve purely materialistic ends. It may be a device to promote his own interests. He may join a fashionable church offering him helpful professional connections, associations that boost his ego. In the final analysis his religion may have hardly anything to do with disinterested loyalty to goodness and God but may be an adjunct to one consuming ambition, personal advancement. Could anything be further removed from the Gospel of Christ with its stern, emphatic warning, "Whoever would save his life will lose it"?

Look at the matter from another angle. Take the emphasis placed by some on religion as the guarantor of peace of mind. Do you want to be done with sleeplessness, worry, ineffectiveness? Do you want to be free from frustration and tension? Do you want to be resourceful, influential, prosperous? Then turn to religion. It can solve all your problems, supply all your needs, provide you with "Peace, Power and Poise in Perpetual Possession." There is truth here but it is truth mixed with error. One aspect of the Gospel of Christ is so played up that its other aspects go unmentioned. What about the strait gate and the narrow way? What about self-denial and the voluntary shouldering of a cross? Dr. Luccock does not exaggerate when he suggests that there is a danger in America of abbreviating

the New Testament to one word, the word "relax." I quote him. "A score of book titles proclaim the word or the idea: You Must Relax, How Never To Be Tired, The Art of Relaxation. Sermons follow suit . . . When this kind of thing is poured on too steadily the result is that all tension is taken out of life. And there can be no true Christianity without tension. Take the tension out of the mainspring of a watch and you have beautifully 'relaxed' steel; you also have a useless piece of junk. A person can become so relaxed, so free from all disturbance about anything, that he likewise is a useless piece of junk. We will soon have a rewritten gospel, thus: 'If any man would come after Me, let him keep down his blood pressure'; 'Go ye into all the world and relax.' "

Or take the use people make of prayer. What is prayer? In its essence prayer is the orientation of the soul towards God. It is keeping in touch with the Infinite. Of course, when God is conceived as our Heavenly Father it is natural to lay before Him our needs and interests, our hopes and fears. A son, however, who is worth his salt, does not go to a father only to beg. Yet with some prayer consists chiefly of petition, self-regarding petition at that. We remember God when we want Him to run an errand for us. We think of Him for the most part with reference to emergencies and crises, personal or national. Who ever heard of a national day of prayer in times of tranquility and peace? We are more concerned to have our religion serve us than redeem us. God is not sought for Himself but for what He is able to do for us. Prayer for thousands means asking for personal favors, blessings for ourselves and for those belonging to us. It is a sort of Aladdin's Lamp to be resorted to in an emergency when help is urgently needed. The higher ranges of prayer—thanksgiving, intercession, adoration, communion—are unknown to us.

Religion is abused when prayer is employed as a means of providing us with whatever we want. This is to conceive of God as a kind of Celestial Valet, as an amiable and indulgent Grandfather who will see to it that all goes well with us. Where do people get the idea that Christianity will smooth their path through life, making everything pleasant and easy? Not from the New Testament which says very bluntly, "In the world you will have tribulation, but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world." Not from Jesus who died on a Cross aged 33. Not from Paul whose life was one long adventurous conflict—"foes without and fightings within" was how he once summarized it. Not from the Apostles, not one of whom died in his bed. Not from the Martyrs, the Prophets, the Heroes of the Faith in any age. The other night, reading David Livingstone's diary, I came across entries like these: "Took my belt up three holes to relieve my hunger."

"I am indulging in sumptuous feasts of my own imagination." "With hands all raw and bleeding we at length emerged." "The natives have taken away my sofa; the stones are left. I am spared the necessity of making a will. It should be easier to move now." What is needed in contemporary religion is less of the mercenary temper and more of the self-denying spirit of a Livingstone. We are here to serve God, not to have God serve us.

II.

If this is true at the individual level it is just as true at the national level. There are signs in plenty of a religious revival in America today. The denominations are reporting membership totals and budget income at an all time high. In a review of books published in 1954 *The New York Times* points out that from a glance at the sales charts it would seem that the average American wants most of all to (1) get religion; (2) reduce; (3) refinish an antique Chippendale highboy. Song writers have found it to their advantage to feature religious themes—"I believe," "Are you friends with the King of friends?" "Have you talked to the Man Upstairs?" are samples. Film producers are more than ever aware of the box office appeal of religious drama, especially religious drama plentifully spiced with sex. One hears of prayer breakfasts for Senators and Congressmen in Washington. On tables in restaurants across the country may be found a little card on which is printed three forms of grace before meat—Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish. Formal religion has become a pronounced characteristic of the American way of life.

Every indication of growing religious interest is to be welcomed but there are aspects of the current religious revival that arouse real concern. We must be on our guard against any tendency to use religion merely to serve *the national interest.* We must not too readily assume that Christianity and the American way of life are one and the same thing. When religion and nationalism are closely allied men are prone to identify the will of God with their political aims and aspirations. When political institutions are idolized as was the case in Hitler's Germany religion is apt to be exploited. The inclination then is to have God serve the nation rather than to have the nation serve God. Take the widespread attitude adopted towards Communism. Communism, we say, is atheistic. We are against Communism. Therefore God must be on our side. The danger here is that we may go on, with God for our Ally, to claim His support for our racial, economic, national aims. We may confuse our cause with His cause. Consciously or unconsciously we may identify Him with the free enterprise system. We may develop a chosen people complex.

When this happens there is little likelihood of candid self-criticism. There is just as little prospect of genuine social concern. The disposition is not only to accept but to seek to safeguard, preserve, freeze the status quo. A depressing feature of the current religious revival is that a number of its leaders are social reactionaries and derive support from social reactionaries. Surely a truly religious nation s bound to be a nation with a lively and sensitive conscience. It knows that it is under the judgment as well as the grace of God. It is conscious of sin and eager to improve and amend its ways. Why are Europe and Asia critical of America? They think ours is a self-righteous attitude. They say that the United States is not *under* anybody, that God is reckoned an Ally, not a Master and Judge. They complain that there is scant evidence of that religious penitence, that acknowledgment of divine condemnation of national sins that marked Lincoln's second inaugural or made Jefferson tremble for his country when he thought of slavery and remembered that God was just. It is their contention that the average American may be formally religious but that he is far from laboring under a sense of sin. We do well to give heed to such criticism. To use religion as an instrument to promote our purposes is to abuse it. We are here to serve God, not to have God serve us.

III.

The Frenchwoman Simone de Beauvoir wrote a provocative book following a visit to America. I quote from it one paragraph. "To see nothing but a political line in America's moral optimism would be wrong, of course; the sons of the Puritans believe sincerely in Righteousness and Virtue. Somebody quoted a remark by the German philosopher, Scheler, that seemed very fair: 'I thought the Americans were hypocrites,' he wrote. 'I thought that when they said "God" they meant "Cotton." But no, when they say "God" they mean "God." The wonder is that there is always "cotton." ' And indeed, if they begin by associating God with cotton, and identifying Virtue with Prosperity, they can invoke the name of God and Virtue without hypocrisy or risk. Good has as much to offer as evil, and is profitable, no doubt if you can channel it. The great American hoaxes are not based on lies, but rather on virtues ably exploited. It is quite true to say that Europe has need of America; in the eyes of the average American, imperialism takes on the guise of charity. American arrogance does not consist in the love of power; it is the love of imposing on others that which is good; the miracle is that the key to paradise should be in their hands."

So I come back to the point from which I started—the theme of the Book of Job. Virtue is not to be identified with prosperity. Religion

is not to be practised because it pays to be religious. There are high uses to which religion should be put—conquest of temptation, superiority to pain, triumph over circumstance, enhancement of personality—none of them selfish uses. Our faith should enable us to get nearer to God and man and God's will for man. It is the will of God first, not our personal security or national security. Christianity is in the world not to make life easier but to make it nobler. To be sure there are rewards, but they are not motives for conduct, they are the consequences of it, and they are spiritual rather than temporal. He who has the bondsman's mind and works only for the hireling's pay, will only get what he works for. But he who serves for love finds in the service itself that which is always its truest recompense—the increased power of service, the capacity for larger devotion. "The wages of going on," Tennyson called it. What is it that makes the life of the Christian abundantly worth living? It is not external payment. It is growth in character and service. It is the developing power of being good and doing good.

God sought for Himself, not for His gifts—that is the supreme blessing to be desired. The will of God, not our own will—that is the suppreme end to be pursed. There have been men and women who have reached those altitudes. To think of them is to long to resemble them, and that is the first step on the upward way. It is why I have asked you to think about Job. There is a service which is entered into without any thought of reward. There is an integrity of character which is not a vulgar barter for wages. There is a heart loyalty capable of facing hardship, disappointment, reverses because it is rooted and grounded in love for God. So Livingstone could say, "People talk of the sacrifice I have made in spending so much of my life in Africa . . . It is emphatically no sacrifice. Say rather it is a privilege."

Not for weight of glory,
Not for crown and palm,
Enter we the army,
Raise the warrior psalm;
But for love that claimeth
Lives for whom he died:
He whom Jesus nameth,
Must be on his side.

*Prophecy, Apocalyptic, and the Historical Hour**

Martin Buber

The man who, without particularly reflecting on himself, allows himself to be borne along by the bustle of life, still at times unexpectedly finds himself confronted by an hour which has a special and even an especially questionable connection with his personal future. Among his possible reactions, two stand out as essential. The man of whom I speak can now in the next instant renounce the beaten track, draw forth the forgotten primal forces out of their hiding places, and make the decision that answers the situation; he cherishes the until-now-unsuspected certainty of thus being able to participate in the factual decision that will be made, on the ground of becoming, about the make-up of the next hour and thereby in some measure also about the make-up of the future hours. Or, in contrast, he banishes all impulses of this nature and resolves, as one says, not to let himself be fooled—not by the situation, which is just an embroiled situation and not by himself, who is just a man come to grief—for everything hangs together invincibly with everything and there is nowhere a break where he could take hold. So he surrenders anew to the turmoil, but now, so he thinks, out of insight.

If, disregarding all differences and complications, we transpose this hour—with its indwelling possibilities of these two basic human attitudes set in polar opposition to each other—from the realm of biography into that of history, we catch sight of a problematic into which it may be salutary for us to look.

But from what standpoint is this problematic adequately to be grasped, as is necessary in order that, gazing with clarified spirit

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**This essay is a chapter from Martin Buber, POINTING THE WAY, edited and translated by Maurice S. Friedman, to be published by Harper & Bros. in the Fall. Used by permission.*

into the depths of reality, we can make the right choice between affirmation of choice and denial of choice? How shall we manage to escape from the dilemma whose discursive expression is the old philosophical quarrel between indeterministic and deterministic views of the world? It is not within the power of philosophical dialectic to offer us this help; the highest that is given to it to attain here is instead of setting the two aspects in opposition to each other, understanding them as the two irreconcilable-reconcilable sides of the same happening. By doing this, to be sure, philosophy does justice to the life experience in which the moment of beginning the action is illumined by the awareness of freedom and the moment of having acted is overshadowed by the knowledge of necessity. But where it is no longer a matter of aspects, neither experienced nor recalled, and no longer a matter of their connection with each other, but of the soul's innermost question of trust, all this does not suffice to guide us.

This question is: Do I dare the definitely impossible or do I adapt myself to the unavoidable? Do I dare to become other than I am, trusting that in reality I am indeed other and can only thus put it to the test, or do I take cognizance of the hindrance in my present existence as something that will eternally be a hindrance? And transposed from the realm of biography into that of history: does a historical hour ever experience its real limits otherwise than through undertaking to overstep those with which it is familiar? Does our future establish itself ever anew or is it inescapably destined? For this innermost inwardness of our praxis there is no other help than trust itself or, to call it by its sacral name, faith. But not our own personal faith alone. The history of human faith also affords us help. Only no simple help of such a kind that the right is simply placed before our eyes in historical realization as a truth that no contradiction confronts. A glance at man's history of faith may so clarify the antithesis of the two possibilities that the decision between them can take place in full light. In the history of faith, my faith finds an irreplaceable support even there where it only receives a new manner of choosing.

II

In the history of faith of Judaism these two basic attitudes rose into the purity and unconditionality of the religious sphere, embodied in two great manifestations of the spirit which, by virtue of this purity and unconditionality, assumed a significance for the way of man in the world and particularly for the present stretch of the way, hardly to be comprehended deeply enough.

These embodiments are the prophets in the ages of the kings of Judah and Israel and the apocalyptic writings of Jewish and Jewish-Christian coinage in the age of late Hellenism and its decline. It is not here a question, therefore, of the changing historical events and the judgments passed concerning them under the summons of the divine by the prophet or apocalyptic writer living at that time. It is rather a question of two essentially different views from the standpoint of which the prophetic sayings on the one side and the apocalyptic texts on the other are to be understood. Common to both is faith in the one Lord of the past, present and future history of all existing beings; both are certain of His will to grant salvation to His creation. But how this will manifests itself in the meeting with the pregnant moment in which the speaker speaks, in what relation to coming events this moment is to be seen, what share in this relation will fall to men, to begin with therefore to the hearers of the speaker —in these the prophetic and the apocalyptic messages essentially diverge.

This difference, as has been said, is by no means of merely historical significance: it has something of the utmost importance to teach each generation, but more specifically our own. In order to throw this into bold relief, I must disregard all that is atypical, elementally significant though it may be. I must disregard the question of what apocalyptic motifs are already, here and there, to be found among the classical prophets, what prophetic motifs are still, here and there, to be found among the late apocalyptics. I must show the essential difference of the basic attitudes through the clearest examples.

III

In a time when the external and internal crisis of the kingdom of Judah began to manifest itself in momentous signs, about twenty years before the destruction of Jerusalem by the Chaldeans, Jeremiah received the divine command to go to the workshop of the potter in the valley below; there God would speak to him. We understand what is meant: the prophet shall contemplate a reality that shall become for him in the midst of this contemplation a revelatory parable. He went down there and beheld how the potter fashioned the clay on the double wheels. "And if the vessel that he made was marred while still in the clay in the potter's hand, then he made out of it again another vessel, even as it seemed right to make to the potter's eye." Three times, in the great Biblical style of repetition, the word "to make" is hammered in on us: the matter in question here is the sovereignty

of the making. In contemplating this sovereignty, Jeremiah receiv the statement of God in which again, time after time, that word recu "Cannot I do with you as this potter, O house of Israel?! Behold, as t clay in the potter's hand, so are you in My hand, O house of Israe At one instant I may speak over a nation, over a kingdom, to root o to tear down, to dismantle—but if that nation turn from its evil f the sake of which I have spoken against it, I am sorry for the evil th I planned to make for it. And again at one instant I speak over nation, over a kingdom, to build up, to plant, but if it do evil in M eyes so that My voice remains unheard, I am sorry for the good wi which I have said I would benefit it."

We must bear in mind that in just this verbal language, abou two decades before, the young Jeremiah had received his summons a "announcer to the nations." "To whomever I shall send thee," it wa there said to him, "thou shalt go, whatever I shall command thee, tho shalt speak." And while he felt on his mouth the touch of a finge he heard further: "I have put My words in thy mouth; see, I appoin thee this day over the nations, over the kingdoms to root out, t tear down, to dismantle, to annihilate, to build, to plant." The com munication to him as the chosen *nabi*, the "announcer," that is, th one who utters the speech of heaven to earth, comes to him now unde exact relation to the language of the summons, opened out in its mean ing, while the lower potter's wheel revolves before him and the vessel are formed on the upper wheel, the successful ones to remain in the world, the failures to be rejected and shaped anew.

Thus the divine potter works on the historical shapes and des tinies of the human nations. But, in accordance with His will, this work of His can itself will, can itself either do or not do; with this doing and not-doing that it wills, it touches on the work of the Worker. From the beginning He has granted this freedom to them, and in all sovereignty of His fashioning and destroying, He still gives to them just thereby the answer—fashioning and destroying. He "is sorry for" the planned good when they turn away from Him; He "is sorry for" the planned evil when they turn back to Him.

But the announcer—this creature that God once addressed, "Thou shalt be as My mouth"—is a part of the happening. For he is obliged at times to say "what God is working," as it says in the prophecy of Balaam (Numbers 23:23)—to say it to those whom it concerns. He can do that, however, in two different ways. The one way is the open alternative. Thus we hear Jeremiah time after time speak to his people in the most direct manner when he delivers to them the concise saying of God: "Better your ways and your affairs and I shall allow you to dwell in this place." But when those so appealed to persistently

resist the call, the alternative grows silent, and the approaching catastrophe is announced as an unalterable destiny. Yet even in this announcement the gate of grace still remains open for the human turning of the being. Here too no end is set to the real working power of the dialogical relationship between divinity and mankind, within which compassion can answer man's turning of his whole being back to God.

This dialogical depth of reciprocity between heaven and earth is brought to its strongest expression by the prophets of Israel—from the early ages till in the midst of the post-exilic epoch—through one of those meaningful word-repetitions and word-correspondences which so richly abound in the Hebrew Bible. The turning of the being of man and the divine response are often designated by the same verb —a verb that can signify to turn back as well as to turn away, but also to return and to turn toward someone, and one whose fullness of meaning was taken advantage of in the texts. Already in one of the earliest of the Biblical prophets, in Hosea, we hear God speak first of all, "Return, Israel, unto the Lord" and once again, "Return," then it says (just as latter in Jeremiah), "I shall heal your turnings away," but now follows, "I shall love them freely, for my wroth is turned away from them." This correspondence, expressed through the repetition of the verb, between the action of man and the action of God, which is not at all a causal but a pure dialogical connection between the two, continues in a clear tradition of style into the post-exilic age. The late, yet word-powerful prophet, Joel, sees in his vision a terrible enemy approaching, yet the description of the threatening invasion is followed by God's statement, "Return to me with all your heart"; then it says once again, "Return to the Lord your God"; but now it is said, "Who knows whether He will not return and be sorry."

The same turn of speech, "Who knows," as expression of the timid hope of those turning back, we find again even in the late fable of Jonah who, contrary to the prevailing interpretation, seems to me to stem from a time in which there was, at any rate, still a living tendency to make clear to the people that the task of the genuine prophet was not to predict but to confront man with the alternatives of decision. It is not mere literature; rather, with all its epigonic character, it is still a real echo of the prophetic language in the shape of a reverent paradigm when the King of the Ninevites first calls to his people, to whom the exact data of their destruction have just been announced, "Every one shall turn back from his evil way," and then adds, "Who knows, God may return, He may be sorry and may turn back from the flaming of His wrath, and we shall not perish."

What kind of view of the ruling of the Ruler underlies all this? Clearly one that wants to preserve the mystery of the dialogical intercourse between God and man from all desire for dogmatic encystment. The mystery is that of the creation of man as a being that has the power of actually choosing between the ways, and ever again and even now has the power to choose between them; for only such a being is suited to be God's partner in dialogue in history. The future is not fixed, for God wants man as one who comes to Him with full freedom, one who can return to Him even out of a condition of extreme hopelessness and then is really with Him. This is the prophetic *theologem* that is never expressed as such but is firmly set in the foundations of Hebrew prophecy.

An apocryphal gospel fragment of Jewish-Christian origin has the Holy Ghost say to Jesus at the hour of the baptism in the Jordan that he has awaited him "in all the prophets." This historical waiting of the spirit for the fulfillment of the intention of creation through man is the breath of life of prophecy. The prophetic faith involved the faith in the *factual* character of human existence as one that factually met transcendence. Prophecy has in its way declared that the unique being man is created to be a center of surprise of creation. Because and so long as man exists, factual change of direction can take place, toward salvation as well as toward disaster, starting from the world in each hour, no matter how late. This message has been sent forth by the prophets to all future generations to each in its language.

IV

Many noteworthy mixed forms lead from the historical sphere of prophecy into that of apocalytic, but it does not belong to my present task to discuss them. I must, however, call one individual manifestation to mind because it signifies throughout not a transition form but the exception. I mean that anonymous prophet of the Babylonian exile who has been named after Isaiah, not only because his prophecies have been included in the Book of Isaiah, but also because he clearly understood himself as a posthumous disciple of Isaiah's. Among the prophets he is the man who had to announce world history, and, to be sure, as the divinely predestined history of the world. In place of the dialogue between God and man is the comfort of the One preparing redemption to those He wants to redeem; God speaks here as not only having foreknown but also having foretold what now takes place in history—the revolutionary changes in the life of the nations of the world and the liberation of Israel connected with it. There is no longer

room here for an alternative: a future is spoken of that is established from the beginning.

This transformation of the prophetic perspective was facilitated for "Deutero-Isaiah" by the fact that he associated himself across the centuries with the great announcer who, as the memoir of which he was the author shows, ever again knew himself bound by the cruel duty to withhold from the people the dimension of the alternative and who often can only utter it in symbols. But essentially the transformation had been made possible by the unheard-of new character of the historical hour. Here for the first time, a prophet had to proclaim an atonement fulfilled through the suffering of the people. The guilt is atoned for; a new day begins. During this time in which history holds its breath, the alternative is silent. In this moment it is no longer a question of choosing as a people between two ways but apprehending as an individual the new, higher summons which shall be fulfilled through the series of "servants of the Lord," a series at the beginning of which the speaker sees himself. An epoch such as ours, entangled in guilt and far from atonement can learn something great from this prophet, but it cannot take anything directly from him. Here something removed from our wills shines on us comfortingly.

V

If we wish to set in contrast the historical categories of prophecy and apocalyptic in the greatest possible purity of their special natures, then, as we proceeded from the prophecy of Jeremiah as one that embodies in the exact sense the prophetic vision of present and future, so for the presentation of the apocalyptic, we shall now do well to choose one of its two most mature late works—the Revelations of John and the so-called Fourth Book of Ezra. Although the work that concludes the Christian canon is the more significant of the two, I still prefer the other for our purpose since here a fuller insight into the relation of the speaker to history that is happening is afforded us. The book, of which one can say with some certainty that its constituent parts originated around the middle of the first Christian century, obviously received its final form only decades after the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans. Yet the speaker pretends to be living in the time after the destruction of Jerusalem by the Chaldeans, as a member of the king's house in exile.

This instance of literary fiction common to most of the apocalyptic writers is by no means a secondary phenomenon: the actual historical-biographical situation in which the speaker speaks is deliberately

replaced by an alien situation taken over as one analogous to his ow That already takes us into the depths of the problematic. For th hour in which the prophetic word allows us to take part is that of th actual decision to which the prophet summons those addressed by him not seldom at the risk of martyrdom. In the world of the apocalypti this present historical-biographical hour hardly ever exists, pr cisely because it is not a question of a decision by men as a facto in the historical-superhistorical decision. The prophet speaks to th persons who hear him, to those who should hear him. He knows him self sent to them in order to place before them the stern alternativ of the hour. Even when he writes something down or has it writte down, whether already spoken or still unspoken, it is always intende for particular men in order to induce them, as directly as if they wer hearers, to recognize their situation's density of decision and to ac accordingly. The apocalyptic writer has no audience turned towar him; he speaks into his note-book. Rather, he does not speak, he only writes; he does not write down the speech, he just writes his thought —he writes a book.

The prophet speaks the word that it is his task to speak; he is carried by this task, proceeding from a divine purpose and pointing to a divine goal. The spirit moves him, and as his organs of speech, so the whole man is taken up into the service of the spirit. The body and life of the man become a part of this service and by this a symbol of the message. The task of a message is at times laid on individual apocalyptic writers, but this message is not joined to a life task. The author of the Ezra-revelation does not recognize at all a vital task. At the beginning of his book the speaker—we do not know whether it is the actual speaker or only the fictitious one that is meant —lies on his bed and, visited by a great anxiety over the fate of Israel and that of the human race, laments to heaven and complains of the government of the world while relating to God in some detail Biblical history from the creation on, supplemented by critical questions. Conversations with angels follow who disclose to the so-called "Ezra" the mysteries of heaven and of the coming aeon; visions are associated with it, mostly of a schematic-allegorical nature, and are interpreted piece by piece in an orderly fashion. At the conclusion a task is set, but it is merely an ingredient of the literary fiction, and apparently it is not even of the original one, for instead of that prince of the sixth century, Ezra the Scribe stands here before us. Ezra is commanded to write down the twenty-four books of the Old Testament canon and in addition seventy books of secret teaching; after this has taken place, he is removed.

Nowhere in the book stirs the prophetic breath of actually-happen-

ing history and its fullness of decision. Everything here is predetermined; all human decisions are only sham struggles. The future is not something that comes about; it is already present in heaven, as it were, present from the beginning. Therefore, it can also be "disclosed" to the speaker and he can disclose it to others. His innermost question, accordingly, is not concerned with what poor man shall begin but why things stand with him as they do. In this question, to be sure, the question of Jeremiah and Job why good befalls the wicked and evil the righteous is again taken up under the aspect of world history. The question is raised why Zion was abandoned and the certainly no better Babylon spared, but to it is joined the new and altogether different question how there can be wickedness in general. It is a question of the origin of the "evil heart" through whose working Adam and all begot by him have fallen into sin and guilt.

Here, however, we must distinguish two stages. In the one a kind of hereditary sin is recognized that was entirely foreign to the Old Testament. There, despite all consciousness of the historical burden that was growing ever greater, each man stood anew in the freedom of Adam; his capacity for decision was not hindered by any inner inheritance. But now the apocalyptic writer cries out, "Ah Adam, what have you done! When you sinned, your fall did not come upon you alone but also upon us, we who stem from you. For what does it help us that an immortal aeon is promised us when we have done death's work?" And he has God proclaim with the utmost precision: "When Adam disobeyed my command, the creature was condemned."

But the speaker goes further. That Adam sinned arose from his own nature, and this he received from God. God had put into him the evil heart, and He had left it in Adam's descendants. Even when He revealed Himself to Israel, He did not take the evil heart from them; therefore, the awareness of the truth could not hold its ground against the "bad sprout." And the answering angel confirms with still stronger statement, "A grain of evil seed was sown in Adam's heart in the beginning"; now the whole harvest must come up, and only when it is cut can the field of the good appear. This view of the apocalyptic writer fundamentally contradicts the earlier prophetic teaching but also the contemporary early-Talmudic teaching, according to which an evil urge was not placed in the heart of man in creation, but only the still neutral passion without which nothing could succeed; it depends on man whether it takes the direction toward God or falls into directionless chaos. It was here understood as the intention of creation, therefore, that the world should become an independent seat of free decision out of which a genuine answer of the creature to his Creator can issue. The apocalyptic writer, on the contrary,

though he knows, of course, of the struggle in the soul of man, accords to this struggle no elemental significance. For him there exists no possibility of a change in the direction of historical destiny that could proceed from man, effected or co-effected by him. The prophetic principle of the turning is not simply denied in its individual form, but a turning of the community is no longer even thought of. The turning is nowhere acknowledged to have a working that alters history or even one that manifests itself eschatologically, again in the utmost contrast to the early-Talmudic tradition which held that the historical continuation of existence depends on the turning.

But to this must be added that the mature apocalyptic no longer knows a historical future in the real sense. The end of all history is near. "Creation has grown old," it says here as something unalterably established, and this is stated still more penetratingly perhaps by the Baruch apocalypse: "The procession of the ages is already almost past." The present aeon, that of the world and of world history, "hurries powerfully to the end." The coming age—the transformation of all things through the incursion of the transcendent—is at hand. The antithesis of the coming age to all historical ages is expressed most strongly by a sentence of the Johannine Revelation that outreaches all that can be imagined: "Time will no longer be." The proper and paradoxical subject of the late apocalyptic is a future that is no longer time and he anticipates this subject so that for him all that may yet come in history no longer has a historical character. Man cannot achieve this future, but he also has nothing more to achieve.

VI

Prophecy and apocalyptic, regarded through their writings, are unique manifestations in the history of the human spirit and its relationship to transcendence. The first originates in the hour of the highest strength and fruitfulness of the eastern spirit, the second out of the decadence of its cultures and religions. But wherever a living historical dialogue of divine and human actions breaks through, there persists, visible or invisible, a bond with the prophecy of Israel. And wherever man shudders before the menace of his own work and wishes to flee from the radically demanding historical hour, there he finds himself near to the apocalyptic vision of a process that cannot be arrested.

There is also, of course, an optimistic modern and transformed shape of apocalyptic, the greatest example of which is Marx's view of the future. One has wrongly ascribed to it a prophetic origin. In

this announcement of an obligatory leap of the human world out of the aeon of necessity into that of freedom, the apocalyptic principle alone holds sway. Here, of course, in place of the power superior to the world that effects the transition, an immanent dialectic has appeared; yet in a mysterious manner *its* goal too is the perfection, yes, the salvation of the world. In this its modern shape, too, the apocalyptic knows nothing of an inner transformation of man that precedes the transformation of the world and cooperates in it; it knows nothing of the prophetic "turning." Marx could, indeed, occasionally (1856) write, "The new forces of society"—by which the prerevolutionary society is meant—need, "new men in order to accomplish good work," although according to the materialistic interpretation of history, new men can only arise from the new postrevolutionary conditions of society. But such scattered sparks of the prophetic fire are certainly to be found in every apocalyptic. No living man who from his personal experience knows free decision and its share in the objective change of situations can persist uninterruptedly in the thought of a smoothly predetermined happening bereft of all junctures. In any case, nothing in Marx's basic view of history was altered thereby, and three years later Lasalle could write of it with justification that, linking brazen necessity to necessity, it passes "over and obliterates just for that reason the efficacy of individual resolution and actions."

Today, despite all assurances to the contrary, this apocalyptic with inverted signs no longer occupies any considerable room in the reality of the real thinking of its adherents. But a directly antithetical apocalyptic attitude has taken shape meanwhile in western humanity. It appears to resume some doctrines of the Ezra and Baruch apocalypse after they have been divested of all theology of a coming aeon. The wholly other state of being that was there promised for existence after the end of our world is now annihilated, but the character of the lived present as late, all too late, has been preserved. The world, to be sure, is no longer called creation, but its irremediable old age is accepted as self-understood. Certainly, in contrast to what was done a short time ago, one no longer pushes the analogy with the life of the organism so far that one joins to the fixing of old age the expectation of early death; prognoses of this kind have today become rare. In general, the specific modern apocalyptic is not merely completely secularized, but also, after several more grandiose than reliable starts, it has been thoroughly disenchanted, and accordingly prognoses have become unpopular, which is to be welcomed at any rate. Instead of this, the apocalyptic has now, so to speak, expounded itself in permanence. One no longer says, "One cannot swim against the stream"—the image of the stream to which, indeed, an outlet

belongs, already appears too full of pathos. One rather says, "A late age must behave like a late age if it does not wish to be laughed at." The only poetry that still becomes it is one of a self-directed irony; the only art that still becomes it is one that atomizes things—to employ a striking characterization of Max Picard's; faith has become altogether unseemly. One knows exactly what is legitimate in an aged world and what is not.

If one comes and rebels against the indirectness that has penetrated into all human relationships, against the atmosphere of a false objectivity where each sees the other no longer as a partner of his existence but merely as an object among objects in order then to enregister him in the given connections of "objective" usefulness, then one is upbraided by one's critics as a romantic given to illusions. If one resists the flagging of the dialogical relationship between men, then he is reproached with failing to recognize the fated solitude of present-day living—as if the fundamental meaning of each new solitude were not the fact that it must be overcome on a more comprehensive level than any earlier one. If one declares that one of the main reasons why the crisis in the life of peoples appears hopeless is the fact that the existential mistrust of all against all prevents any meaningful negotiation over the *real* differences of interest, then one is set right by a smile of the shrewd: an "old" world is necessarily shrewd.

The great apocalyptic writings of that earlier turning-point of history were of two kinds. The one held that one could no longer have faith that history would take any new direction, the other that one could believe in an all-determining God only with a special limitation: He can make everything with the exception of a genuine, free Thou for Himself—that He cannot make. Unbelief and belief were here only the two sides of *one* point of view. Of the two only the unbelief remains in the broken yet emphatic apocalyptic of our time. It steps forward with a heroic mien, to be sure; it holds itself to be the heroic acknowledgement of the inevitable, the embodiment of *amor fati.* But this convulsive gesture has nothing in common with real love.

As in the life of the person, so also in the life of the human world: what is possible in a certain hour and what is impossible in it cannot be adequately ascertained by any foreknowledge. It goes without saying that in the one sphere as in the other one must start at any given time from the nature of the situation in so far as it is at all recognizable. But one does not learn the measure and limit of what is attainable in a desired direction otherwise than through going in this direction. The forces of the soul allow themselves to be measured only through one's using them. In the most important

moments of our existence neither planning nor surprise rules alone; in the midst of the faithful execution of a plan we are surprised by secret openings out and insertions. But room must be left for such surprises; he who plans as though they were impossible makes them impossible. One cannot strive for immediacy, but one can hold oneself free and open for it; one cannot produce genuine dialogue, but one can be at its disposal. Existential mistrust cannot be replaced by trust, but it can be replaced by a reborn candor.

This attitude involves risk, giving oneself, yes, inner transformation. Inner transformation simply means surpassing one's present factual constitution; it means that the person who one is intended to be penetrates what has appeared up till now, that the customary soul enlarges and transforms itself into the surprise soul. This is what the prophets of Israel understood by the turning in their language of faith: not return to an earlier, guiltless stage of life, but a swinging round to where the wasted hither-and-thither becomes walking on a way and guilt is atoned in the newly-arisen genuineness of existence.

Toward the end of the first third of that same century in the course of which those apocalypses arose that spoke of the aged world and announced the approaching rupture of history, John the Baptist had again taken up the cry of the prophets, "Return!," and, in complete accord with their belief in real alternatives, had joined to it the threatening statement that the axe had already been laid to the roots of the tree. He trusted his hearers to trust themselves as capable of the turning that was demanded, and he trusted the human world of this hour as capable of just this turning—as risk, as giving oneself, as inner transformation. After Jesus and in like manner his emissaries had taken up the call anew, the apocalyptics and their friends came in order to disclose that there is no turning and no new direction in the destiny of the world that proceeds from the turning. But the depths of history, which are continually at work to rejuvenate creation, are in league with the prophets.

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Kierkegaard and Theology

Paul L. Holmer

Kierkegaard is one of those rare men of reflection—he is too many-sided ever to be a founder of a school of thought. He is not quite properly Lutheran, certainly not scholastic enough; nor is he only an existentialist or even pre-Barthian or anti- metaphysical or an irrationalist. He illustrates the motto which prefaces *The Philosophical Fragments*, "Better well hung than ill wed." Though many of his readers have tried to assimilate him to commodious categories, he does not quite fit. For surely no author with such a regard for logicality can be justly described simply as an irrationalist; neither can a devotee of intellectual tradition and a person of catholic tastes and sympathies be seen adequately only as a man of revolt, existentialist or otherwise; and though there is an 'either/or' bringing distinctiveness to human discourse and choice, yet it must be remembered that Kierkegaard believed in the powers of personality to synthesize otherwise discrepant factors. Though tragedy and suffering were not alien to him, still he was convinced that Christianity was a happiness view and that faith is the victory which overcomes the world.

To describe Kierkegaard's significance for theology has been made difficult rather than easy by the scholarship about him. For often he has been claimed to be Lutheran or on the road to Rome, anti-intellectual or too intellectual, anti-church or pro-Augustine, too psychological or too theological or even both. Actually Kierkegaard is much better as a theologian than his theological critics and adherents make him out to be. He is a radical thinker. He is more concerned with the substructures than with the super-structures and, on almost every page, his interest is directed toward that kind of issue which is elemental and from which perhaps several intellectual elaborations can be made. Simply because he talks about matters common to so many positions taken by schoolish thinkers, it becomes almost an adventure to find him

a therapeutic but Christian positivist, or a neo-orthodox theologian, or the father of existentialism. Besides being mistaken most of such claims are trivial and an indictment of the scholar who makes them.

A most general point about Kierkegaard perhaps deserves to be remembered. Kierkegaard was, intellectually considered, a diacritical thinker. He was able to make and to sustain distinctions. He excelled in the use of diagnostic abilities and was able throughout his career (brief as it was—he began writing in 1841-42 and was done about nine years later) to ferret out the skein of possibilities with the utmost of logical rigor. This is the aristocratic and technical side of the man and his authorship. Here he sought to be rigorous, exacting, precise, in fact everything that any scrupulous man of intelligence discovers necessary for intellectual transparency. But the other side, and equally important, was his abiding interest in the synthesis proposed by Christianity for human personality. At once Kierkegaard commanded those dialectic and pathetic (i.e., capacities for pathos) talents which enabled him to indulge and yet to study those pervading emotions and commandeering interests which make existing distinctively human. The point then is that Kierkegaard combined an analytic intelligence with an ethico-religious and synthesizing passion. His authorship endeavors to dignify as well as to express the nobility of the simultaneity of factors within the personality, and especially as this is constituted by faith in Jesus Christ.

All of this should caution the reader against too quickly summarizing Kierkegaard's thought. Reflection moves by distinctions and exclusions and bifurcations but existence is, like the mock turtle soup of which one of his pseudonyms speaks, full of everything. Knowing that the exclusions in thought might not entail exclusions in being, Kierkegaard is very wary indeed in circumscribing what is real. Thus he does not deny metaphysics all meaning simply because he denies that thought and reality are one. Nor does he deny the objectivity of Jesus, of actual existence, of canons of thought, simply because he notes the importance of subjectivity and the difficulties of the ontological logic of his day. And he is not quite a sectarian and a voluntarist on distinctively Christian matters simply because he notes intellectual and ethical discrepancies on matters like the Church and the sacraments. But, neither is he meekly traditional here either.

Surely Kierkegaard was a wise man. He knew that intellectual extremes were daring and even exciting but here common sense was his guide. His intellectual affirmations were tentative and subject to recall. But ethically and religiously he sought decisiveness and maximal risk-taking. The leap of faith was an act whereby the personality constituted itself, whereby character was formed. To keep oneself ethically

decisive while admitting intellectual uncertainty was part of Kierkegaard's admonition towards the good life. The fact that an erstwhile Christian culture had blurred this difference and the fact that philosophers had proposed ontological understanding, the understanding of being itself, as the bridging of the gap, led Kierkegaard to his task of reintroducing Christianity into Christendom and making numerous viable intellectual distinctions all over again.

Four issues will be here adumbrated. Though these might indicate Kierkegaard's relevance to contemporary theology, still more it is hoped that they may incite that kind of enthusiastic attention deserving a man of pervading Christian compassion who was simultaneously an aristocrat among the 'cognosciendi'.

I. The Meaning of Religious Discourse

First it ought to be noted that Kierkegaard addressed himself to the problem of the meaning of religious discourse. It is a commonplace among students of eighteenth and nineteenth century theological literature to note the difference between saving theology by converting its statements into metaphysical claims on the one hand and historical claims on the other. The Gnostics had even tried, much earlier, to vindicate theological claims by showing that no historical claims were essential. And today, once again, there are fervent endeavors among the theologically inclined to show that theology can be de-mythologized and, further, that committment to Jesus Christ does not entail a committment to a metaphysical schematism. All of this is part of the large and vexing inquiry into the meaning of religious discourse.

It is perhaps a dubious distinction to impose upon an author, namely, that he wrote on a topic relevant to men of a century later. Besides, Kierkegaard wrote on this topic only indirectly and in consequence of a concern with the question of the locus of religiousness. Though Kierkegaard knew too that the Christian religion had permeated our customs, our literature, and our language with glory and hope, he was not content to let the contemplation of these objectivities be the primary religious act. He contended against Hegel, not so much because his empirical descriptions were either wrong or absurd, but, rather, because Hegel denied in his grandiose interpretation the religiousness of human subjectivity. It is Kierkegaard's merit to have stressed the fact that theological language, whether this be the language of the Bible or the more formal discourse of the theologian, corresponds also to human subjectivity.

Unlike other thinkers who make a point by excluding too much, Kierkegaard does not deny the possibility of objective reference to theological language. However, his point is a pregnant one, and fraught with all kinds of as yet unexplored implications, namely, that religious discourse is not religious because it conveys results. The point of religious language is not to communicate results as much as it is to stimulate the process of experience and thought which will reconstitute human personality. Ethico-religious truth is, in other words, not a quality of the language itself but is rather the process, the striving of the human subject to be a definitive individual.

Though this kind of point is frequently made, and usually clumsily, it is to Kierkegaard's credit that he makes it with both an aristocratic intellectual intent of clarifying the muddle that the learned create on these matters, and an earnest religious endeavor of showing that the simple man as well as the learned share the condition in their subjectivity for the realization of the highest truth which Jesus Christ is. Kierkegaard had no sympathy with Spinoza's religion in which God is actually the sum total of the logical predicates available to an aristocratic mind. Likewise, the translation of the language of Christianity into that of the logic of historical existence, which Hegel tried to effect, Kierkegaard protests on both intellectual and moral grounds.

But, as yet, Kierkegaard is relatively untried on these matters. However, one hundred years ago he admitted the objective uncertainty of theological pronouncements and hence was not disturbed by Biblical criticism of his day nor would he be chagrined by the confessions of intellectual incertitude in ours; but, withal, he noted that the primary question was the quality of one's own life, his own subjectivity, and that no theological sentence was religious in meaning until the appropriation process was stimulated and human passion aroused.

I am bold enough to suggest that recent theology is positively amateurish on these matters. Kierkegaard's epistemological and technical acumen holds a great promise for future formal inquiries upon which so much theology depends. But even more than this, Kierkegaard was a master at etching out the devotional requisites of Christian religiousness and not least of his disinterestedness is expended on the task of reflecting himself out of the esthetic, the philosophic, and the aristocratic, and back again into the devotional and the simple.

II. The Importance of Passions and Interests

A second consideration marking Kierkegaard's theological relevance is his disclosure of the importance of passions and interests. Few authors have been so marvellously equipped for this kind of task as that Dane.

He wrote effortlessly and gives the impression of writing with the immediacy that the bird sings and the flower spreads its fragrance. It is no wonder that he thought of himself as a poet. Once his literary goal became clear, his authorship comes forth almost completely free of those niggardly and finite calculations marring so many artistic and literary productivities. He wrote out of his own inwardness which was rich indeed and in a style not calculated to please his public but one adequate to his own insight. But, for this very reason, he succeeds in writing out of his own pathos and writing his way into the pathos of another individual, his reader. If nothing else, the Kierkegaardian literature is so rich in pathos, so replete with those dimensions of human subjectivity that are truly universal, so expressive of refined passions and concerns, that here alone it will bridge long spans of time and continue to challenge moral turpitude and laxity.

Such honesty, sincerity, and flaming concern, expended as it is in an authorship which defines religious truth not as sentences to be learned but as dynamic becoming of the self, are theologically important by themselves. But Kierkegaard did more. He described the casual and efficacious role of interests and passions in the greatest detail. He brings together what are otherwise so often separated in Christian tradition. For him, the emphasis upon the objectivity of Jesus' existence, of the Atonement, and other divine acts, does not deny the existence nor the significance of subjectivity. In fact, it is his intent not to correct Protestant theology here as much as it is to supplement its account by showing that subjectivity too can be orderly, that it can and indeed, must, predispose the person. Instead of distrusting subjectivity as Lutheran dogmatics and Church practice suggest, Kierkegaard delineates carefully the role of despair, of dread, of guilt, this to make clear that no one is a sinner deductively and only because the dogma says that all men are sinners. A subjective state does correspond and Kierkegaard is apt at pointing it out, all the while skillfully noting the differences as various objectivities, laws, mores, God, Christ, are engaged.

But more than this, Kierkegaard notes too that the content of Christian religiousness is finally passional and interestful, not conceptual. Not only are modes of subjectivity the cause of religious striving but the appropriation of religious teaching, and of anything else religious which is objective and social, leads to another mode of subjectivity. Even love, the *agape* of the New Testament, must be a passion. Kierkegaard felt a responsibility as author to lead his reader out of subjectivity and into the contemplation of objectivities only for the sake of the new subjectivity which Christian faith, hope, and love are. Surely this is of a distinctive note in theological and philosophical writing and

worthy of very careful attention. Few authors have been as successful in saying this in a congruent manner as was Kierkegaard. For he destroys as he moves along his own authority and calculates the effect of his writing in such a way as to augment the passional response within the reader.

Kierkegaard, as also noted in the previous section, is here proposing a new basis for the discussion of theological issues. In centuries past, when theologians were able to talk with impunity about the final and efficient causes of nature (this because the physicists already did so), when men of religious learning could espouse easily the fortunes of God in the progress of men, then there seemed little reason to believe that human subjectivity was naught else than a mirror, confused and distorting indeed, of the passing scene. But Kierkegaard is suggesting that the inner life is not a mirror of the outer existence. It is not a chaos, not a random or caused array. Kierkegaard's literature is the disclosure of the life of subjectivity as a cosmos, capable of being mapped and described, in some respects independent and in ethico-religious senses most important of all. By saying that an interest in and a passion for existing is the reality that men can actually practice and own, Kierkegaard proposes a kind of metaphysics, not only compatible with Christianity and the New Testament, but also a new point of departure for theological discussion.

III. The Pragmatic Significance of the Person of Jesus Christ

It may seem amiss to say it but Kierkegaard seems also to have rediscovered the pragmatic significance of the person of Jesus Christ. All kinds of books can be written about Jesus Christ just as they can about Plato, each book taking account of the history of the teachings, of institutions, of the criticisms of either, and all of this being a documentation of the significance of the man. Each book thus written is in turn an item in history to be understood again as a part of the growing significance of the man. But it is Kierkegaard's point that as true as the respective historical accounts of Plato's and Christ's significances might be, still this is not the proper way to describe the bearing upon human interests of the person of Jesus Christ. As important as scholarship might be, Kierkegaard brings a correction to the view that grows up where religious studies are pursued and taught, namely, that by increasing the scope and broadening the grasp, the personal and intense religious response will follow as a matter of course.

Certainly it is true that Christianity has its own tradition and that this is both extensive and refined; likewise there is an institutionalizing of the idea which has resulted in the Church becoming a formidable

power in the affairs of men; and not least, rightly or wrongly, there are external authorities, men and books, which are reputed to keep the keys to the treasures of life eternal. Kierkegaard neither denies nor affirms with enthusiasm the above views. But what he is concerned to point out is the fact that no one of these is, nor all of them together are, in such connection with the individual that the Christian's response is ever passionless, habitual, or trivial. Instead there is the person of Christ and He is the paradox. This latter word, "paradox', is intended by Kierkegaard to safeguard the uniqueness of the Christian's object of interest. Paradoxicality describes that kind of relation and object which Christianity and Christ are.

On the object side, Christ is the paradox because no premises offered to reflection can make loyalty and faith to Him a necessary and inevitable consequent. He is neither obviously God, nor inductively speaking, even the greatest man who ever lived. Even if He were the latter, still an absolute committment would be incommensurate with the approximative and necessarily hypothetical conclusion. But on the subject's side, there is paradoxicality because He is the object of interest, offense or faith, scorn or worship, without that kind of justification which decisiveness seems to ask. The interest which He asks in His own existence and person, is an interest not congruent with self-interest nor is it congruent with that reason which we all invoke quite concretely as the reflectively organized common sense of mankind. The contrariety of interests on the subject's side is many-sided of course. Disinterested analysis and reflection suggest a suspension of decision while the guilt and concern going with it counsel the need for a resolute decision; it does not quite seem to be in one's own interest to deny oneself and his interests in order to save oneself. Jesus Christ seems to be asking that men live by dying, that they win by losing, that they get by giving.

Kierkegaard's theological fecundity is again rich on two sides. On the abstract and formal side, he has produced and argued with exactitude the doctrine of paradoxicality and several related doctrines which constitute in part, surely, the prolegomenon to future Christological discussion—even if like other prolegomena this one too may help to circumscribe the inventiveness and exuberance of speculative thinkers. But, on the ethical and practical side, Kierkegaard is even richer. There is an almost lavish outpouring of literature from his pen on the consequences in human existing of an active relation to and interest in the existence of Jesus Christ. This again does not lack exactness and form but rather vindicates the view that Christian subjectivity has its esthetic features, its suppleness, its variants, and even its sophistication. Where most authors are pedestrian and flat-footed and at best can repeat Biblical rubrics with only slight elaboration, Kierkegaard

can both illustrate in his own person and sketch for his reader the dramaturgical feature of Christian inwardness.

Not least of the relevance of the figure of Jesus to the person is the fact that a response to Him is not exclusively intellectual, or emotional, or dutiful. It is to Kierkegaard's credit again to have corrected the intellectualism of Protestantism and brought ethicality and empirical behavior back into consideration. Kierkegaard insists that religiosity too is a living synthesis of the personality in thinking, feeling, and willing. The esthetic factors are not extirpated, the ethical is not abnegated; instead Kierkegaard delineates the richness of the faith relation by showing that even many sets of categories cannot quite exhaust it. All of this is testimony to the personality values which Kierkegaard discovers to be a consequent of the comtemporaneity of Jesus Christ.

The thesis that contemporaneity with Jesus is actually possible involves Kierkegaard as it is has everyone who thinks about it in numerous problems, epistemological and theological. Kierkegaard repudiates the use, though not necessarily the truth, of the substance doctrines and other gambits of the past. Instead he suggests that Jesus Christ exists as the contemporary only when one's own interest and passion is Christ-like. His suggestion is that the historical Jesus when viewed detachedly and disinterestedly is not the eternal contemporary. But when one forgives trespasses, as the prayer of our Lord suggests, then we are forgiven; when one loves an enemy, one is loved. But one is not loved because of one's own love, one is loved contemporaneously. Kierkegaard too is concerned to say that one's deeds do not merit God's attention. The presence of Christ is not a disinterestedly guaranteed and objectively warranted phenomenon. Again I can only urge that Kierkegaard's reflections here are most suggestive and seem to bear out the New Testament as well as augur well for further consideration.

IV. Re-reading the Human Situation

Last, and briefly, Kierkegaard has read exceedingly well the features of human existence. Many of the listeners in the pew have noted that things in the world are not quite the way the preacher has described them. When one hears the pulpit fulminations about the horrors of sin, and these horrors get no amplification other than that provided by either gross sensuality or misuse of public trust, then it certainly becomes difficult to fit the theological categories to every man. Kierkegaard corrected the interpretations, not by reforming the dogmas but by examining again the way it is we actually behave. Thus he sees us as sinners when we are sensual but also when we are most

spiritual and moral. Nowhere does he suggest that sensuous delight in the things of the world is *ipso facto* sinful.

But all of this is part of his long essay in re-reading the human situation. Every issue he touches, the faith and reason controversy, the question of original sin, the significance of music, gets a new and creative treatment. If one analyses all of this, it is surely the case that Kierkegaard makes his reader see that one's own personality, not history and not nature, is the locus for the presence of God. The larger orders may have their teleologies, God is undoubtedly present in all things occasioning their working together for good, but it is is still men who must love God. Again, Kierkegaard does not deny in order to affirm—his domain is personality and he dares to believe that Christ died for every man and that the paramount concern must be to become a Christian. Once the inner teleology is taken care of, then the natural and historical scene may be read for what it is worth.

Hence it is that Christian faith is not alien to personality as Kierkegaard understands it. The otherness of God, the distinction between God and man, are not treated in anything but human terms. This must be remembered about Kierkegaard for he is only mistakenly associated with these traditions which emphasize God's transcendance in non-human categories.

Perhaps few writers have said so much about the glory of our common humanity as Kierkegaard did. Not a little of that glory is evident in the very fact that so much can be known and said about being human and being Christian. For Kierkegaard too, being Christian was a human perfection, not to be gainsaid because it is human nor slighted because it is finally a matter of grace.

In a day when human nature is in such bad repute, when the very fountainhead of sin-talk seems to be Kierkegaard, it might be well to discover how careful he was, how anxious to do justice to the sensory capacities, the aesthetic refinement, the genial admixture of pluses and minuses that we all are. The diatribes in his literature are reserved for those who have levelled all the valleys, who have straightened all the paths, who have taken the heights and depths of personal expession away from their fellows. All of those who, impressed by the engines of society and anxious to secure conformity to God, country and duty, and who have slandered man by taking the adventure away—these are Kierkegaard's foes. That they include the clerics too, he was quick to note. His enthusiasms were, instead, for the restoration of passion, of expressiveness, of the individual's caring mightily. His literature is an attempt to restore the individual and his idiosyncracies to a place of honor. For it is by rubbing that Aladdin's lamp, one's own personality and subjectivity, that one discovers God in Christ reconciling the world and oneself unto Himself.

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AT ALL BOOKSTORES

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Religion and Teaching

Mary Anderson Tully

This topic "Religion and Teaching" is an intimate one and yet a theatening one: intimate, in that it is "close to home" to each of us; threatening, in that we must face up to this intimacy (because intimacy spells responsibility). We *are* today more or less, what teachers have freed us to be, or hindered us from being. Teachers in the classroom and in the home do have "influence" and "authority". And we are the products of that teaching and *we* ourselves *are* teaching whether we know it or not.

For me, teaching and religion are not separated. They cannot be. Together they are one ultimate concern! What is happening to that boy, that girl. What purpose is to be served by their lives? And from whence does this purposing come? This is what my religion is all about. This my teaching has always been about. Teaching at its greatest is religious, and religion at its concretest is and must be taught or shared. This, I believe!

It is my conviction that teaching is a far more deep-reaching and inclusive affair than mere instruction; and that which we teach and how we teach it inevitably express our beliefs about life and its meaning which is (to me) religion. And it is my deep conviction that springing out of the Christian faith, if one takes it seriously, are many insights which point the way to answers to the questions which present-day teachers are raising.

The Affinity of Teaching and Religion

But allow me to define my terms a bit more explicity, even though definitions are dangerous. What is good teaching? It is the influence of one total personality upon another. A good (meaning effective, not necessarily efficient) teacher fosters, maintains, and intensifies life in a less mature person. This involves life on every plane (if psychological insight is to be taken into consideration)—the intellectual, the

emotional, the imaginative, the physical, and the spiritual. It is difficult to distinguish between these planes. As a matter of fact distinctions are made by poor teachers. The good teacher is aware that all merge into one, and is concerned with the undivided life of the undivided boy or girl. He goes about his work in such a way that the abundant life is possible. He feels it to be his greatest duty so to teach whatever it is he is teaching, in such a way that the students feel that life matters and matters greatly, that nothing in it is irrevelant, that all experience could hang together and form an ordered whole: that life is worth living to the full and that if it is so lived it makes sense.

Real teaching is a process in which the student and the teacher are involved personally. In this sense real teaching is existential teaching. One comes to greater self-consciousness in relation to himself, his peers, to the culture, and to the world.

Now let me say little about what "religion" is for me. My feelings about "religion" are most closely yet not inclusively caught up in certain statements of Santayana and Tillich. The former said "Piety is a reverent attachment to the sources of one's being and a steadying of one's life by that attachment." And Dr. Tillich says, "Religion is the depth dimension of every function of the human spirit."—By this I assume he means feeling, ethical, cognitive, moral, aesthetic. Religion is the aspect of depth in each and all of these—that which is ultimate, infinite, unconditional, of ultimate concern. So you see, I am defining religion with reference to its most personal aspect.

So, if I define teaching at its greatest as the impact of one total personality on another less mature one, and if I define religion as the depth dimension of the life of the human spirit in confrontation with the Holy Spirit in the inner drama, then I am saying that teaching and religion are never separated. They are organically together. Religion is either implicitly or explicitly, i.e., blindly or recognizably, a part of, not apart from every teaching situation. And teachers within a structured relation (i.e., a relationship set up by society, in contrast to the home where the relationship is more informal) stand always on the brink of the depth dimension of personality. And this can be either destructive or redeeming. Whether a teacher realizes it or not, this organic interaction in the teaching relationship involves the spirits of the teacher and the learner. This unconsciously is one of the reasons for the uneasiness that teachers feel, I believe, above and beyond the enviromental anxiety about salaries, prestige, overwork.

Therefore, I am not concerned with wording the question "Should a teacher be religious?" (By that I suppose one means, has a religion.) Nor am I concerned with the question of religion in public education.

I am not concerned with the teaching of a body of dogma or creed, i.e., selected subject matter of religions to be taught separate from, or as a part of, other subjects in the schools. I am concerned with the teacher as a person. It is time we looked at him as a person, an individual worth looking at, and listening to. I am concerned about teachers as persons in the schools and also in the local churches. I am concerned that we as laity see the one selected by the community to be "the teaching one" as he really is and is aspiring to be. I am concerned about the teacher's life—its wholeness, its synthesis. I am concerned about the cultural situation reflected in public schools and churches, in which teachers find themselves and the resulting effects on the quality of their teaching, which in turn is a reflection of what is happening in the inner life of the teaching profession. The situation in which teachers find themselves is uneasy. We as teachers are uneasy. I believe this uneasiness points to new levels of awareness that must be attained in our spiritual pilgrimage. The members of the teaching profession are a sensitive, articulate, questing, questioning group. I believe there are insights within the Christian faith, perhaps in embryo yet is far as our day is concerned, which the church laity *together with* and including the teachers can discover.

So I as teacher will ask the church some questions. Then I as a church member will react to these questions very briefly, because I think *you* will have to answer your teacher's questions along with them in dialogue.

External and Internal Demands on the Teacher

First, then I speak as a teacher. As a member of the teaching profession I want to share with the church the nature of "The Crisis in Teaching" as Oscar Handlin called it in his article in September's *Atlantic Monthly*. It is out of this crisis that some of our questions arise, and it is because of it that other questions come in by the back door, so to speak! This crisis can best be discussed in terms of "*demand*"—external and internal.

There is a demand for more of us. Due to the pressure of tremendous population changes since World War II and because of mass compulsory democratic education, ¾ million new teachers will have to be recruited in the next three years. This means one half of all those receiving Bachelor's degrees each June must become teachers. Our educational plants are inadequate both in schools and churches. It is impossible obviously to recruit this gigantic corps of teachers and train them. By 1965 there will be nearly 12 million more elementary school-aged children and 6 million more high school children than

in 1950. By 1950 we had lost 150,000 teachers to military service, business and industry. It is serious situation. This demand for more of us creates a tension within the teching profession. Teachers are overworked, classes are too large, and frustration is mounting because of teacher's feelings of inadequacy to handle today's children in these impossible conditions.

Then, there is a demand for more from us. There was a day when teaching was held within well-defined limits. Certain given community purposes were emphasized and taught to all—whether it was the inculcation of certain habits through ritualistic learning, or the memorization of a code governing conduct under tutors, or the intellectual drilling of the 3 R's, or learning a craft under a master. But times have changed. As Barzun of Columbia University says: "the teacher is no longer a paid detective hunting stray commas." Today, our task is defined by Grayson Kirk: "the primary purpose of the school is not to increase earning power but to enrich the human spirit." He was reflecting John Ruskin of an earlier day—"You do not educate a man by telling him what he *knows* not but by making him what he *was* not."

Now this does not mean that we disagree with this new direction in teaching. It is inevitable that this pioneering go on. We have never yet, I believe, faced up to what mass democratic education is, what it costs, and whether it is possible to make it work. And in the church, we must take these new advances in public education into serious consideration but also fight out our own definition and philosophy of Christian Education for our day.

This is tremendously difficult for the teachers. These great shifts in emphasis over one century bring untold insecurity to the teacher, (and he doesn't always realize it) I myself in one teaching career went through three different shifts in emphasis in public education. And there is a tendency for this shifting pendulum to swing so far, that today's emphasis is negated in favor of an utopian one just being born. Fortunately this does not filter down to the grass roots teacher, but it gives headaches to the teacher-principal-supervisor who is formulating policy and procedures. An example of this is the issue in which I was caught when the shift was made from "subject-centered" to "child-centered" curriculum. (Can we ever be without the great teachers concerned with research and scholarship and could we ever be without the great pastoral teachers who in intimate relationship guide the very young? The pastoral teacher is not and can't be oblivious to the world of ideas and knowledge nor can the great scholarly teacher ever be really oblivious and unheeding of the learner.) Yet even having said this, we know that more is demanded of the modern teacher. Somehow there is a pervading dogma that education is the

hope of the world. And teachers are supposed to do everything that the rest of the society leaves undone. There is *a demand upon us* as teachers. We are responsible to the *home* (help my child now), to the *adult church* (be faithful to the past also), to *industry, business, and professions* (prepare the young to hold jobs for the future)—voices thundering at us if we have sensitive ears.

And besides, we are the only occupational group whose real earnings have fallen since 1940. In contrast with other professions it looks sad. We are in the embarrassing position of seeing ourselves in every daily newspaper pleading for salary increases; e.g. in the New York Times on December 28—"Flint, Michigan starts its school teachers at $400 a year less than it starts its garbage collectors. Three years ago a New Jersey high school teacher quit his $85 a week teaching job to drive a beer truck at $135 a week . . ."

And so there is a loss of esteem, self-respect at the very moment when a much more important role is being demanded of the teacher. Handlin's description here is much to the point: "Increasingly, and tragically, teachers find themselves surrounded by colleagues who accept the popular image of themselves. Deprived of status and prestige they acquiesce in the lowly role society assigns them. They can only withdraw timidly to a self-contained world of their own with its own standards, often entirely out of touch with reality. Thus they confirm society's impressions of a lowly group, not quite first-class and deserving of no better than the hand-me-downs of our culture." And now I begin formulating the kinds of questions a teacher might ask the church.

The Teacher's Questions to the Church

The questions could arise from two sources: first, from the critical situation in which teachers find themselves today on the American scene. These questions might be worded thus:

Can the laity of the church (which includes teachers themselves, of course) do anything about (a) the recruitment of teachers to meet the shortage crisis? (b) the salary deficiency of teachers? (c) the raising of the morale of the teacher in a community? Can the laity of the church do anything about (a) the recruitment and training of a corps of professional teachers for the educational work of the church? (b) the raising of the morale of the church school teacher in the church? (For our church school teacher is not sufficiently recognized and does not feel adequate for the job). You may feel that the problems raised by these questions cannot be solved by the laity of the church. I don't know how you feel about the church taking action to help solve social problems.

The second source from which questions may arise is one in contrast to the social scene. It is the individual inner life of the person of the teacher. If you have time I would suggest that you read a small book published in 1955 called "*When Teachers Face Themselves*" by Arthur T. Jersild, Professor of Education, Teachers College, Columbia University. This book is Professor Jersild's most recent study of the inner life of the teacher. Over a thousand teachers responded to questions in a "Personal Issues Inventory" in personal conference and in written form. Dr. Jersild says in his introduction, "The problems and concerns revealed fell into a number of categories, about thirty in all, but it was decided to focus attention on the nine that appeared to receive the greatest emphasis: meaninglessness, loneliness, sex, attitudes towards authority, freedom to feel, feelings of homelessness, feelings of hopelessness, hostility, distress because of discrepancy between the "real" self and the demands and expectations imposed by self or others." This small book goes on to describe very sympathetically the inner feelings of the teacher. The answer given in the book is that self-understanding is necessary for the teacher and this can be gained in a variety of ways through psychiatry, counseling, group therapy, work-shops.

Let me say here that I have a real conviction (and I suspect Dr. Jersild feels the same) that, above and beyond the form of the answers given in Dr. Jersild's book, religion, and I hope the local church, can give a kind of answer that would be very difficult if not impossible for those trained solely in a secular humanistic fashion.

From the Jersild study and from my observation of and conversations with teachers, this kind of questioning then emerges which challenges the resources of the church: (1) What does the church say to us about our feelings of anxiety, lack of freedom, guilt and insecurity? (2) What about the problem of freedom and responsibility which we meet head on in our profession? (3) How can we recover a sense of Vocation?

The Church's Debt to the Teaching Profession

Secondly, I speak as a member of the Church. I would like to thank the teaching profession for the great corps of religious educators that it has literally poured into the life of the church in Canada and the United States of America. A significant example of the debt that the work of the church owes to this profession is the great corp of public school teachers who man the teaching jobs in the churches. As a matter of fact, I would wonder if the church's educational program could function if the teaching profession did not stand as a vast volunteer army for recruitment.

I am not suggesting that this should continue, that we should now hasten to recruit more and more public school teachers to work in the churches. I offer two cautions in regard to this. First, I think the church should not add to the working hours of the public school teacher. This would not help the laity on the job as is the suggested emphasis of this series. Teachers need the weekends to recuperate and replenish their own spirits, or they will not continue to do well by the young. (It is always a bad habit to consider time out of the classroom a reward instead of a condition of effective teaching.) My second caution is this: even with public school teachers assisting, the present Religious Education in the Protestant churches is inadequate. And no improvement within the set-up as it now exists will solve the problem because we need more time and a professionally trained leadership to do the job. But until the church finds some way of producing a corps of trained personnel, I can see that we will have to continue to ask the teaching profession to form part of our church staffs. Public school teachers do a wonderful job in the church but they are very frustrated about the dichotomy that exists between the philosophy of public education and religious education, and the lack of time and training to do the unique job in the educational task of the church.

I would also as a member of the church like to ask forgiveness for my share in what has been done under the cloak of religion to cause distortion and repressions in the personalities of the young, which has caused teachers such difficulty. The church has not always been too insightful about how the young become religious. There has been without and within the church distorted views of personality and it is also safe to say that this grouping of persons vocationally called "teachers" have themselves been nurtured, trained, guided, as children, as youth and as teachers so that they are not wholly responsive personalities, and now are forced to face themselves. However, we rejoice in the situation to the degree that they *can* face themselves, ask these questions, and discover the religious method as an alternative to the scientific. Christian belief and Christian obedience are not blind. We can now begin to be authors of our own response.

Now allow me to suggest a framework within which to look at these qustions. Incidentally, I don't believe these questions are separated from each other even though we have stated them separately. They are life questions. The framework or context I am suggesting is a "questioning" one. Let me show you what I mean. At times in my life in the Christian community I have felt free and safe enough to ask a question, any kind of question. Lo and behold, the answer came back in the form of another question! Now, this is not unique

to the Christian community, but I am saying that at critical times in my life I have found a "saint" who gave me freedom enough and security enough to ask a question. Then, with understanding, led me to ask another question. In other words, I was led from my very superficial first question to ask a more ultimate one. If my first question had been answered, in the usual fashion, I would have gone away in thirst and hunger. This may not seem to be of much help but it is. It is such a relief to stop fussing with a,b,c,d, answers on a level that doesn't really matter and get down to formulating the right question. What a catharsis it is to be carried out of one's own thoughtless, demanding structure to one of cosmic reference.

For example, we are always on the verge of the formulation of a new educational philosophy, as I have indicated before, and one wonders what new faith will now take possession. Someone proposes that education must be free. The Christian is led to ask, "What is the nature of freedom? How does one become free? Free for what purpose?" Someone else says, "Education must prepare the individual for life." The Faith asks, What kind of life? Again, there is a hue and cry that teachers must educate for leisure time. And again comes the question, "First, what is the nature of vocation?" Again, some emphasis that it is the community that matters—educate for group life. Back comes the ultimate question: "Is the group more important than the individual? Is one type of idolatry better than another?"

Teachers must select a context of meaning out of which they can formulate the right questions. Today's teachers and especially today's teachers, need the freedom and a structure within which to discuss what their questions really are, and to have the joy of discovering some of the Christmas answers.

The Problem of Feelings of Guilt and Anxiety

Now a word about the feelings of anxiety, guilt, insecurity, hostility. I feel inadequate to discuss what many fine scholars and psychologists within the church have explored in the recent outburst of literature along this line. I just want to assure the teaching profession that many of us in the church understand and are sympathetic.

The Protestant church is beginning to realize how important it is to encourage expression of the inner life and is giving real attention to ways of making this expression constructive. Gradually, it came to mean a great deal to me to realize in my reading that our Scriptures and the history of Christianity abound with examples of men and women who expressed with dignity and sensitivity the contents of the inner confrontation. It was not always (and still is not in some quarters) acceptable, mainly because it was not understood. But

nonetheless, the life of the spirit in its aspirations, its doubts, its fears, its inadequacies, it loneliness, is revealed in the Record, e.g., the Palms, Jonah, Job, the prayers of Jesus; and also in the stories of the lives of the saints, mystics, and founders of the church. Who could ever forget the great cry of Jesus—"My God, My God, why have you forsaken me?" This is part of our blood, bone, and marrow. And what teacher does not identify with the cry of Moses who on being challenged to lead his people cried, "O My Lord, I cannot do this, I am not eloquent, I am slow of speech. They will not listen to me."

Teachers can be free to feel anxiety, guilt, fear, insecurity; they have in their humanness a right to feel these. They need not be embarrassed because they feel. But they don't stop there, thinking the recognition and acceptance of these feelings is the whole story. They must go on to see that the presence of these feelings illuminates what they really are. They are not only superior animals. They are in God's image. They are spirit. They are creators. Christianity alone, in facing these facts of disillusionment and meaninglessness is ultimately optimistic. It is because teachers really touch the depth dimension of feeling, imagination, intellect, that they can claim their true humanity and ultimately be joint heirs with Christ in God's Creation.

The Problem of Freedom and Responsibility

Let us think now about the problem of freedom and responsibility as faced by the teacher. In the West we stand in a tradition which says that education must always be a social matter—belonging to the people and existing for the people. To what extent is a teacher responsible to the community at large for doing what the community at large wants her to do? There will always be lurking in the situation the danger of subtle manipulation—manipulation of the teacher by the policy-makers on the one hand, and manipulation of the child by the teacher on the other.

We have seen in Nazi education a whole generation manipulated because certain truths were repudiated which if denied by us will bring similar peril: The denial of an objective standard of Truth, the subordination of the intellectual to emotional training (or vice versa), the denial of the integrity of the individual. German youth were taught to participate at a sub-personal level. The manipulation of a whole corps of German teachers and the manipulation of a generation of children and youth was the result. This indicates a highly motivated and dedicated top leadership in the teaching profession—but again the question from the Christian community: dedicated to what? whence the springs of action?

Let us look at the other aspect of the problem of freedom in this profession. We have said that the teacher stands in relationship to less mature personalities. He does influence these personalities. The inner life of the teacher, the quality of her being, is the hidden agenda of education. There is nothing to be gained by saying naively that we should not influence others, that we should leave them free! I always think in this connection about a wonderful story, told tongue in cheek, which goes: "I showed him my garden," said Coleridge, "and told him it was my botanical garden." "How so?" said the other, "It is covered with weeds." "Ah," Coleridge replied, "That is only because it has not yet come to its age of discretion and choice. The weeds, you see, have taken the liberty to grow, and I thought it unfair in me to prejudice the soil towards roses and strawberries." The teacher does something to the soil. He leaves it alone. He overworks it. He nurtures it in cooperation with the laws of growth.

The problem of teaching with or without prejudice faces every concientious teacher both in public and in church school. On the one hand, he is encouraged to "put himself across," (this must include his convictions, beliefs, too, else he wouldn't be putting himself across) and then he starts worrying about indoctrination. On the other hand, a teacher is encouraged to be objective, not to share his views—lest he stunt the growth of the learner. Then he begins to question his honesty.

Now, a teacher has to be a free person, but more important still, the Christian faith maintains that he must be a freed (or in religious language a "saved") person. Only if he is freed can he cease to use his teaching materials for defensive purposes. Being freed is an internal religious problem. One manifestation of his freedom is the way "power" is handled. The teacher stands on an internal island. On the one side with the flow of the waves comes in the ship *Powerful* and on the other side with the ebb of the waves goes the ship *Powerless*. A freed teacher knows what it feels like to exercise his power, allowing the great flow of his energy and emotion to be invested freely in the young. At the same time, and only he can know the moment when, he feels he must withdraw his power. The flow and ebb. As one educator said, "The hard thing is that the more we have given the youth our deepest ideals (and so our real selves) the more we want to make sure that they cherish these." Yes, he opens the doors wide, which means investment without stint, of love and time and wisdom, but still he gives the power of moral choice, of decision, of a yes, or a no, to the learner. A teacher could say, as Jesus said,, "I come that ye might have life." But again, "It is expedient for you that I go away." This the Christian faith has taught me to see.

The Problem of Vocation: The Hazard of the Swinging Bridge

Now in relation to the problem of vocation, let me make one suggestion. Is it possible that we have had an unrealistic picture of our profession? I wonder why persons become teachers? On conversing with many teachers, I find that they "just drifted into it," for a good many quite unromantic, mundane reasons. One thing has stood out. They did expect it to be a fairly secure profession. I remember asking sixty lay church teachers who had assembled to study teaching methods why they had become teachers in the church. I got a great variety of answers (all anonymously and frankly given) and again the over-all thing for which they were asking was security—emotional security mostly—(as over against financial), the need for friendship, the need to atone for guilt resulting from mistakes in bringing up their own children, the need to be dutiful, the need to serve and be useful.

In public life and in church life, teachers have expected this profession to be secure. To my mind, teaching will always be a precarious profession, even if (and I hope they are) the societal problems of inadequate salaries, long working hours, many and varied curricular demands, shifting philosophies, and community status and prestige, are solved. If his teaching is truly great, the teacher will at times be sorely torn. At other times, he can reach out and touch the hem of His garment. They have expected this profession to be secure. I say, "They can't ask this." It will always have great possibilties for insecurity. Once they see this and accept it, they will see the tremendous challenge in this profession. They will raise their heads once more, and walk tall, glorifying God.

Let me explain a little more what I mean by "divine insecurity." One source of insecurity for teachers (and here teaching is akin to preaching) is the fact that teaching depends for its very life on communication. By this I mean, "I the teacher have not taught until the other has learned, I have not taught until I the teacher have learned and the student has taught." This is the dynamic organic interactive process of teaching and learning. Now this is the most exacting of standards with which to judge whether they succeed or fail. A surgeon knows when an operation is successful. A chemist knows when a formula is exact. A plumber knows when the pipe no longer leaks. A lawyer knows when he has won his case. But how does a teacher know when he has taught? When Billy is quiet? When Billy can write a paper? When Billy writes without blots? When Billy cooperates in today's game? What about tomorrow? He may not do any of these tomorrow.

And so the insight comes. They must not depend for their security on these tangible results. There may not be any. They must not de-

mand from this profession more than they ought. They must have faith and a goal that is beyond today's faltering feet and great enough to encompass tomorrow. And Christianity helps them to learn faster than most the difference between the relative and the absolute.

Existential teaching, too, will always contain another hazard which makes for their uneasiness and also their challenge. I call it the hazard of the Swinging Bridge: The Swinging Bridge that you build out of the stuff of today and throw out across the waters to tomorrow. Teachers stand in the human scene and yet they feel the tug towards the divine. Teachers stand there, as men mold their gods or find their God, between actuality and potentiality, knowing the country from which they are now departing and not yet knowing the new country whose shores they have not yet touched. This great privilege Christian teachers can know.

So, the individual teacher must have a fortress, a lonely citadel, where he can retreat. Here on the altar he lays down the *power* he knows he has, and thus learns how to release or leash it; he lays down his *freedom* (and thus learns true discipline out of which freedom comes); he lays down his *fears* (knowing that a great Love will cast out fear); he lays down his *skills,* his *knowledge;* so that having given up freely, he may then take them up again and use them in humility. This the Christian religion teaches. The teacher lives in the human scene, serving people, but he must provide the time for the nurturing of a dynamic faith of his own else the days will become more and more sterile.

"By faith, teachers when they are called to go out into a place which they should after receive for an inheritance, obey; and they go out not knowing whither they go. By faith they sojourn in the land of promise, as in a strange country, dwelling in tabernacles. For they look for a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God."

The Old Testament in the Church

Elizabeth Achtemeier

Every believing Christian has experienced events, turning points, crises in his life in which, in retrospect, he is sure he can point to the action of God. Church history is full of witnesses to God's action in the lives of His saints. Even the last war produced scores of books by pilots or footsoldiers, claiming that they had been miraculously delivered from death by an Unseen Hand. And less spectacularly, the happily married man usually carries within him the quiet conviction that his beloved mate was foreordained from the foundations of the world to be his and his alone.

These are small examples. On a larger scale, we see in the death of a Hitler the judgment of a righteous God upon evil. Communism has become, for some of us, the same judgment, this time turned against our complacency in the face of social and economic wrong. We believe, in short, as the men of the Bible believed, that God acts in history; and most of us are sure that He has, at one time or another, acted in our own personal history.

If we are sophisticated Christians, however, we pause at pinpointing the exact where and when of God's action. We have the conviction that He has acted on our behalf; but, if pushed, we will not cite time and place. We come face to face with the mirror, through which we see only darkly. We can never say, with *absolute certainty*, that God has had a hand in any particular event. To do so would be to identify the temporal with the eternal, to infinitize the finite, to absolutize the changing tide of human history.

It is a bit shocking, therefore, to realize that the Bible is not quite so sophisticated. Not only does it claim that God has acted in human history; it professes to tell us exactly when and where. "I have seen the affliction of my people who are in Egypt . . ."; "After many days

the word of the Lord came to Elijah in the third year . . ."; "And the Lord took me from following the flock . . ."; "In the year that King Uzziah died, I saw the Lord . . ."; "Thus says the Lord to His anointed, to Cyrus . . ."; "In those days a decree went out from Caesar Augustus . . . when Quirinius was governor of Syria"; "I journeyed to Damascus . . . At midday I saw on the way a light from heaven . . ." —these are the "datelines" in which the Bible abounds. They signify God, acting at particular times and in particular places.

This contrast between the Biblical view of God's action in history and our own is enough to give us pause. Just what kind of history is it which we have here in this Book? What, reading it on its own terms, does it claim to be? What "strange, new world" is it trying to reveal to us?

God as the Creator of Biblical History

Taken from beginning to end, from Genesis to Revelation, one must confess that the Bible claims to be the witness to *a history created by God.* There is a view, widespread throughout American theological circles, which holds that the Biblical history is history *interpreted* by faith to be God's history; i.e., it is history which would have happened anyway, but in which faith sees God at work. This is not the Biblical view. The Bible claims throughout that most of the events recorded within its pages *would not have happened* had they not been brought into being by the Lord.[1] (There are some exceptions, such as Gen. 24, but even these have been placed within the context of the *Heilsgeschichte.*) God is the Creator of that which comes to pass in the life of Israel, indeed of Israel itself: Abraham would never have left Haran had he not received the command of Yahweh (Gen. 12:1). Joseph would not have prospered in Egypt except the Lord was with him (Gen. 29:2). The Exodus would not have taken place save for the gracious help of the Lord (Ex. 3:7ff; Dt. 26:5ff). The scattered, half-civilized tribes of Israel would never have become a people unless God had made them His people (Ex. 19:3-8). The conquest of the land (Josh.-Judges), the giving of the kingship (Sam. 8:22)[2], the prophetic revolution (1 Ki. 19:15ff; 2 Ki. 9), the fall of Israel (2 Ki. 17), the destruction of Judah and Jerusalem (2 Ki. 23:31ff), the exile (2 Ki. 25), the return, the restoration (Ezra-Neh.)—all are viewed as history willed, created, and brought to pass by the central

[1] This is interesting to consider in connection with the meaning of the Tetragrammaton YHWH="I who cause to happen what happens"(?).

[2] Although the counter-tradition sees the kingship as an act of apostasy.

figure of the Old Testament: Yahweh.[3]. And the same holds true in the New Covenant. God is the initiator of that which happens, sending His Son, building His church, directing His apostles, revealing Himself to His saints. God is the Creator of Biblical history, and without His activity, it would not have have come to pass. Such is the consistent witness of the Bible.

In this connection a special word must be said about the prophets. Most often they are viewed as interpreters of the event taking place in their particular times. Again this is not the Biblical view. For the Bible, a prophet is not an interpreter but rather an intrinsic part of the event itself. He himself, as a prophet, is the result of God's creative act in history. He is hurled[4] into being, as it were, by the Word of the Lord. Thus, the prophets record their calls, the legitimatization of their existence.

Further, the words which the prophets speak are not interpretative words, but the Word which itself creates the event. And the actions which the prophet does are not magical, or even symbolic, but history-creating actions, efficacious in themselves, because they are part and parcel of God's action in history.

Now this is not to deny that the prophet can speak a false word, one which is of his own creation. Man, who plays out God's history in the Bible, is not automaton, but free to deny his Creator. Indeed, the Bible is one long record of man's refusal to submit to God's dealings with him. Even the prophet Jeremiah is severely rebuked for speaking that which is "base" (Jer. 15:19). But it is to take a fresh look at the prophets and to see in them something besides men discerning the signs of their times. It is to see them as part of a history created solely by Yahweh.[5]

This unique character of Biblical history marks it off as qualitatively different from our own, and therein lies the offense of the Bible—that the Word, that the action of God is inextricably bound up with a particular people in a particular country at a particular time. Be-

[3] The writer is fully aware of the critical problems raised. Obviously there are legends, myths, folk-tales and other *Gattungen* in the O.T. which do not partake of the nature of "history". They never really "happened". Again, each of the great histories of the O.T. has its own perspective and theology. The divine history is "warped", so to speak, as for example in the Deuteronomic material. But our fundamental thesis remains true, and the critical problems must be dealt with in its light.

[4] Cf. the meaning of "Jeremiah".

[5] On this basis, all attempts to speak of the prophets' "ideas of God" or the prophets' "psychological experiences" miss the fundamental message which the Bible would convey. The prophets, as men, manifest psychological reactions and disturbances as bearers of the Word, but such are irrelevant to the revelation.

cause this is true, however, we should be warned against extracting "eternal truths" from the Bible or from generalizing its revelation. To speak of the God of the Bible, we must always at the same time speak of that history in which He reveals Himself—the history of Israel or the history of Jesus Christ, Who is the final remnant, the true Israel. For this reason, Protestantism has always been, as over-against Romanism and Orthodoxy, profoundly correct in regarding the Bible as its sole and final authority for revelation.

The Revelatory Significance of the Old Testament

That this unique Biblical history is revelatory in character has always been accepted without question as regards the New Testament. But the same is not true for the Old Testament. There has always been some reluctance among churchmen to ascribe to the Book of the Old Covenant a revelatory nature. In Jesus Christ, it is said, is the whole and perfect and final revelation; and the result has been, at least in American theological circles, to see the Old Testament as something almost unnecessary to the Church.

We, too, would hold that in Jesus Christ is *the* perfect revelation; but we would also thank God for that divine wisdom which led the early Church to preserve the Old Testament as part of the Christian Bible. For the Old Testament is no less revelatory in character than the New. It, too, witnesses to that unique history created by God, and because it does, it is, and must always remain, part and parcel of the Christian revelation. Let us expand this point a bit.

The history contained in the whole Bible seems to have one purpose in mind—to reveal to us Who God is. Axiomatic is the fact that this revelation is given not in metaphysical or philosophical terms, but in terms of God's action. To the question, Who is God? the Bible replies: I am Yahweh who brought you out of the land of Egypt; I am the King who sent Isaiah out to meet Ahaz at the end of the aqueduct from the upper pool, on the highway to the laundrymen's field; I am the God and Father of your 'Lord Jesus Christ, who was born of the virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried . . .'. There it is, from beginning to end, a witness of God's unique history, the revelation of Who He is in terms of what He has done. And the Old Testament gives us that history, gives us that witness to God's person no less than does the New. It shares, with the Book of the New Covenant, God's revelation of Himself to His people.[6]

The man in the pew, then, on Sunday morning, has need to hear of God's action witnessed to by the Old Testament. The preacher may confront his listener with Jesus Christ as the incarnate God; but what

[6] Of this the N.T. writers were fully aware. Cf. Hebr. 1:1.

God?—the God who brought Israel out of Egypt and made them His people, of course; the God who judged and agonized and loved a stiff-necked folk through so many countless, turbulent centuries; the God who finally, in the fullness of time, had done with their sins by making them His own, borne in the shape of a cross. There is the full story of Who God is; there is the full history of that upstart carpenter, Mary's son. And the preacher is charged with the task to give the man in the pew the full story—nothing lacking!

Perhaps in this way the relationship existing between the Old and New Testaments can be made fully clear. It has often been maintained that the Old Testament is necessary to the New for the understanding of New Testament terminology: "Messiah", for example, is explicable only in the light of the Old Covenant. That is quite true; but the issue concerns more than terminology. It is a matter of ascertaining just Who this God is Who was made incarnate in the city of David in 4 B.C. And the witness to His action in the Old Testament sheds a great deal of light on the subject.

For the Christian in the Church, the relationship between the two Testaments must always be a complementary one. Jesus Christ is the full and final revelation of God. He is God made manifest before our eyes, bearing God's full glory in human flesh. Knowledge, made perfect in faith, of Him and Him alone is necessary for salvation. In Him and Him alone God effected the final redemption of the world. But to understand clearly Who He is, and to apprehend the purpose and action of which He is the consummation, the Christian must read the Old Testament. And contrarily, the Old Testament stands incomplete without Him, Who is its perfection. The Old Testament history, though it be God's, is tragedy without the victory of the cross and Easter morn.

One final word must be said concerning the teaching of the Old Testament in the church. It is still a frequent error of the religious educator to "moralize" the Old Testament. Its relevance for today is seen in its ability to yield general moral or religious truths by which the present-day Christian can live. Its "religious significance" is studied in all its facets. The reason for this is clear: it is felt that a history of 3000 years ago is a remote and irrelevant thing unless it can be "modernized" and made to deal with problems and issues of the contemporary scene. But here, once again, the true revelatory nature of Biblical history is overlooked. The Old Testament has one purpose—to reveal Who God is by witnessing to His action in its history. The Christian, if He would know the God he worships, must study that history. And in so studying he will come to recognize that the God whom he thus knows speaks still, and will continue to speak with His imperatives for the life of today. The important thing is that the Christian be able to recognize Who it is Who commands.

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Religion and the Arts

I. The Basic Question

John Bachman

Problems reflecting the relationship of religion to the arts arise in every local church. When architectural plans must be approved for a new church building there is likely to be an obvious divergence of opinion. One set of plans will appear to be hopelessly conventional to some members of the church, but the plans which they favor may look like a drive-in supermarket to some other members of the church. In the field of music some will always be pleading for more of the "good familiar hymns" and others protesting against the sort of soupy sentimentality which they claim is used in the music of the church. When a dramatic production is being considered there will be many opinions as to what is appropriate for presentation in the chancel or even in an educational building. These varying opinions are due, of course, to differences in taste. But what causes these differences in taste and to what extent do these differences reflect basic disagreement concerning the relationship between religion and the arts?

Certainly there is a wide spread among Christians in their attitude toward the arts. There are still a few American Protestants who have inherited a traditional suspicion of artists and artistic expressions. Here in this metropolitan area, however, with its level of sophistication, many more would probably be found in an opposite camp, perhaps subscribing to the words of Dr. Stanley Hopper in his introduction to the recent second volume of *Riverside Poetry*, when he says "Poetry is always religious, either explicitly or implicitly." Most of us have observed that in our generation the pulpit is seldom as effect-

tive as the theatre and the novel in portraying the human situation, in revealing a sensitivity to alienation, to brokenness, to hollowness. But does this mean that we are ready to leap to the conclusion that therefore all art is religious? Or, if we qualify the statement and refer to "all true art" or "all good art", then by whose standards do we define what is "true art" or "good art", and are we not in danger of playing with words? Are we not substituting "true" or "good" for "religious" and simply begging the question?

Surely we must exercise some discrimination in determining what is religious art, or good art, or good religious art. We are being pressed for a decision by many forces in our society, among them the bombardment of the popular arts through mass media: television, radio and films. For hours each day millions of children and adults are being exposed to forms of music and drama. Attitudes are being developed and reinforced, lives are being influenced—often without any recognition by the listener-viewer that this is happening. For the most part the mass media as industries do not consciously manipulate the listeners and viewers, except to sell merchandise; more basic functions of influence are usually repudiated, as in the oft-quoted statement of policy, "Messages are for Western Union"! Yet there is always the suspicion, and considerable evidence to support it, that these media which repudiate the function of education are more influential in the broadest sense of that term "education", than the schools and churches which pretend to exercise this function. But when this influence is a by-product rather than the expression of a conscious purpose, the results may very well be chaotic.

The Implicit Point of View

Few of the motion pictures and live dramas telecast nightly claim to represent a point of view, yet of course each does. It may be escapist, behaviorist or humanist. It may be unchristian by inference because the persistent treatment of pressing problems without reference to Christianity suggests that Christianity is irrelevant. It is very unlikely to *be* Christian because *that* seems to be something which must be avoided on the air except on programs presented by the churches! Then, to complicate things further, when the churches do produce musical or dramatic programs—or even when churchmen publicly evaluate commercial productions—the results often indicate a distressing confusion.

Two years ago the National Council of Churches presented on one of the major radio networks a program featuring a choir, an orchestra composed principally of brass instruments, and a professional actor reading Biblical passages. A layman arranged and conducted the

music in Radio City style. There was a great deal of mail response to the program, most of which was of this sort: "Thank you for a most inspiring half hour . . . a wonderful preparation for the Lord's Day." ". . . Your program strengthened my faith in the Church." "We welcome this much-needed chance to hear the best in music along with the Word of God." "It had the feel of a new venture and the thrill of an old faith expressed in new terms." A few letters, however, expressed a different reaction: "This gluey mush of fake religion and fake music is a direct slap at the face of those in this country who believe in either religion or art." "What I heard was the church paying to mix the Word of God with the sentimental scum and slime of modern life . . . This, I tell you, is a scandal that really ascends into heaven for 'what is highly esteemed among men is abomination in the sight of God'." The second group of letter-writers would accuse the first group of total lack of discrimination; the first group probably would regard the second as esoteric snobs. We are that far apart in this matter.

More recently another musical controversy has been stirred up by the Reverend Alvin Kershaw, the young clergyman who became a national celebrity through participation on the "$64,000 Quiz" program. Mr. Kershaw maintains that jazz is one of the most authentic expressions of the aspirations and anxieties of the human spirit; he ascribes such religious significance to it that he has used it in worship services in his church. Naturally enough, there is some lack of agreement concerning this viewpoint also!

But not only in music is there a lack of harmony within the church. The film, "The Ten Commandments", has been endorsed with enthusiastic comments by some clergymen and dismissed as "sacrilegious" by others. On stage, "Waiting for Godot" is regarded by some as packed with Christian symbolism; by others it is regarded only as a nonsensical dirge of despair.

Then there are films like "Baby Doll". Cardinal Spellman warned Roman Catholics not to see this film "under pain of sin," to which our neighbor and alumnus Dean Pike responded, "The Church's job is not to condemn portrayals of real life; its job is to provide the answers for the problems which they raise . . . Until people really face the human situation in all its depth and degradation, its hopelessness and futility without God and ethics, its bitterness without redemption, they cannot fully receive the Gospel; and if the Christian laymen have no exposure to, or perception of, these problems, they are in all the poorer position to communicate the saving Gospel meaningfully to others."

Now it is obvious that the relationship between religion and art is a complex one, and there are variations in the problem caused

by the difference in art forms. Some forms of art are quite specific and representational; others are more general, more suggestive, more subjective. We have a range from instrumental music, which is non-verbal and non-visual but auditory, all the way over to drama, which is verbal, visual and auditory. Along the line we have sculpture, painting and architecture, which are visual but neither verbal nor auditory; vocal music, which is verbal and auditory but not visual; and literature, which is verbal but neither visual nor auditory. It is sometimes maintained that the art forms which employ words convey more specific connotations than these non-verbal forms, and can therefore be classified more readily as religious or secular works. A hymn "O God our help in ages past, our hopes for years to come. . ." strikes one as quite specific, but a modern painting may suggest to one person the radiance of God's love, while to another a hint of a sunrise and to another a fried egg. Even this, however, is something of an over-simplification, because some non-verbal forms, such as instrumental music, have very specific connotations for some listeners while certain pieces of literature or drama have no single specific meaning for many, certainly not for all viewers and listeners. According to Mr. E. Martin Browne, T. S. Eliot prefers not to "explain" the meaning of his writing, partly out of the conviction that there may be different meanings for different people at different times. And of course the interpreters, the middlemen, the actors, may change these interpretations by what they do.

Three Helpful Approaches

Our basic question, then, as to the relationship between religion and the arts breaks down into various sub-questions: Can religious concepts be presented explicitly in the form of art or must they be only implicit? Is there such a thing as religious or Christian art, in contrast with secular art? Or is there only good and bad art? Is there really any inherent relationship between art and religion or are there simply religious implications of art, implications which depend for their comprehension upon the orientation of the viewer?

In all of the arts, men and women are struggling with these questions and with their applications to individuals and to communities. Below, two colleagues will answer them in the fields of music and drama. Here, may I present several approaches suggested by the statements of persons working elsewhere in this field?

Amos Wilder wrote for *Christianity and Crisis,* "Christian belief, like Marxist theory, will weaken a work of art rather than strengthen it if it be so employed as to do violence to the total work of the imagination. But all significant literary work benefits from underly-

ing presuppositions of order, and the Christian faith, if not used in imperialist fashion, is a great asset to an artist."

Dorothy Sayers, in her introduction to *The Man Born to be King*,* says, "A work of art that is not good and true in art is not good and true in any other respect, and it is useless for any purpose whatsoever—even for edification—because it is a lie, and the devil is the father of such." She also says pointedly: "A loose and sentimental theology begets loose and sentimental art forms; an illogical theology lands one in illogical situations; an ill-balanced theology issues in false emphasis and absurdity. Conversely, there is no more searching test of a theology than to submit it to dramatic handling."

Thornton Wilder has attempted, at times, to relate religion to art. Early in his career he described several of his short plays as "religious, but religious in that dilute fashion that is a believer's concession to a contemporary standard of good manners." He expressed the hope that he might some day be able to express such truths in more explicit forms, that he might "discover the spirit that is not unequal to the elevation of the great religious themes, yet which does not fall into the repellant didacticism." In many ways and places, Christians are searching for that spirit—that most elusive spirit.

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II. Music and the Church

Robert S. Tangeman

Of all the major arts none has had such a long and intimate life with religion as has music. Architecture stands in a different relationship to religion than does music. In cold climates architecture of some sort is utilitarian; it is as necessary to mere survival as is clothing. Music by comparison is useless. The architect's work is an enduring creation. It lives and functions for centuries more or less as its

maker first saw it in his mind's eye. A musical work is, in a sense, a magical dream of beauty—a constantly shifting, insubstantial, evanescent vision that fills the air about and around us, then vanishes from the realm of reality leaving us moved and stirred to our depths. Music can not be touched or felt as can a work of sculpture or painting. Unless words are added to music the art has no concrete meaning.

Music in worship is primarily an oblation to God. It is the offering by man of what is most fitting and beautiful in the art. This sacrificial character of religious musical expression provides the strongest motive for demanding the use in public worship of the finest music and the most fitting performance. Since it is an offering to the Highest Being, it must of necessity be of the highest quality.

Music is capable further of exalting the mood of the worshiper into a more intense devotion, thereby making it a more acceptable offering to God. Being un-material, being unconcerned with the representation of physical objects, being unconnected with ideas, music, unlike architecture, painting and literature, is able to fly into emotional regions beyond the other arts. It assists in the realization of an escape from the world into the realms of the sublime, which is one of the goals of religion. A second function is that music—combined with poetry—is the main channel of communal expression in the service. Through hymns, whole bodies of worshipers may join in expressions of faith, hope and belief. Music with words added (in fact the whole realm of vocal music) is a dual art made up of literature and music. In its most successful examples, although music does abandon its sovereign independence in this marriage with words, both the thought of literature and the emotion of music may be the gainers. In some almost miraculous way depth may be added to both arts.

Good Taste in Church Music

Due to the intangible nature of the art itself, music, more than any other art, has pitfalls and dangers for those who would acquire knowledge and taste. These dangers are increased ten-fold in vocal music where literary merit may easily conceal musical poverty. Here we can be led astray more than in any other art by extraneous associational values. Church music in particular is susceptible to sentimental attachment or memories, leading us to suspend taste when recollection of non-musical events is evoked.

Good music must use the elements of the art in skillful and interesting ways. Rhythm, melody, harmony, and tone color are the basic elements. Instrumental music is the art of tone in time. Most musicians, I believe, would find themselves agreeing more closely about what constitutes good music in the instrumental branch of the art

than in the vocal branch. Vocal music, since it is a combination of two arts, must be viewed in a quite different way.

It is precisely here that many crises have arisen and continue to arise in the world of church music. For example, the Greek Orthodox Church, (also certain Protestant sects), refuses to employ instrumental music in any form. The widest differences in Roman Catholic and Protestant music come from the question of the words, their meaning and doctrinal implications. In contrast, no French organist would consider any of Bach's organ music unsuitable for use in the Catholic services he is called on to play; nor would any New York organist hesitate to use the instrumental music of Messiaen, Dupré or Langlais, even when these compositions bear titles in Latin embodying Roman dogma.

In the acquisition of taste in church music, an awareness of the enormous variety and diversity of literature available from which to select good works is basic. Church music of the most dazzling complexity has been written and used in large churches staffed with expert performers of all types. In Leipzig, Bach regularly used an orchestra for services—although the players, as well as the singers, were boys from the "Thomasschule". Good music which presents no performance problems for the volunteer parish organist and small choir also exists from past centuries and is being produced today in encouraging quantity.

As a background for the acquirement of a standard of taste no better method exists than thoughtful acquaintance with a large and varied body of all that music which time, the only infallible critic, has endorsed. Above all, it must be kept in mind that simplicity and elaboration are not the same thing as bad and good. The decision as to simple or elaborate music in any church is a purely practical one. Much of the simplest music is strong, wholesome, good—and much of the most elaborate music is weak and poor. The effort to improve the music in any given church has too often taken the direction of merely adding to its elaboration instead of raising its quality.

Probably most important of all is the element of sincerity. Emotional sincerity is not easy to simulate. Good church music will avoid the cloying sentimentality to which so much religious painting and music fell prey in the past century, and it will equally avoid catchy rhythms, facile melodies and commonplace harmonizations which destroy the mood and atmosphere essential to worship.

Sacred vs. Secular Music

It is customary to divide music into two categories: sacred and secular. Sacred music in the vocal area is always based upon religious

words. These texts cover an enormous range and variety in length, historical origin, and emotional depth. We may divide sacred vocal music into two main types: first, service music intended for use during divine worship; secondly, sacred concert music, which, usually because of length, can not be used in an actual service.

There is no fundamental difference between good sacred instrumental music and good secular instrumental music. Convention and long association have established certain styles of both music and architecture as churchly. They are not inherently so. Providing that the music has dignity, seriousness, sincerity, objective beauty that avoids the egocentric and too personal attitude, any truly good instrumental music may be used in church. The music must, of course, avoid associations inimical to an atmosphere of worship. This is a highly personal matter and can easily lead to serious problems. No simple rule can be suggested. Avoidance of operatic music, of theater music, of dance music—all this is of course obvious. In Germany the Lohengrin *Wedding March* is never used for marriage ceremonies because the tragic nature of the opera is too well known to make this music suitable for what should be a joyous occasion. Few Americans know Wagner's opera well enough to associate sadness with the march.

It is sometimes said that all great instrumental music is sacred—that is, that all great instrumental music is implicitly sacred. Without entering into a discussion of this point, may I recall that last fall the Boston Symphony Orchestra performed Beethoven's *Eroica* Symphony in the Cathedral of Chartres with complete ecclesiastical sanction!

Finally, there are many instances of what we might call transformation of character between secular and sacred music. That is, if the mood of a given composition is appropriate, the addition of suitable words will result in a sacred work of art. In this way Bach transformed an aria of Pallas praising Zephyr in a comic birthday cantata into a New Year's greeting to Jesus in the *Christmas Oratorio*. In a similar way the superb concluding chorus of *The St. Matthew Passion* is but an expansion of a harpsichord Sarabande with words added. Anyone wishing to pursue this subject further need only examine any standard hymnal for music that began its life in the secular world.

Lessons from the History of Church Music

There are one or two lessons from the history of church music worth our attention for the light they shed on our present day situation. First of all, the long and fascinating history of church music shows constantly recurring periods of strife between ecclesiastical authority and musicians. In the early 14th century, Pope John XXII issued

decrees from Avignon banning progressive technical developments then appearing in church music. In the middle of the 16th century, the Council of Trent's music committee contained certain members who all but urged the banishment of the art from public worship. The youthful Bach was censured by his church board for using strange, harsh harmonies in playing the hymns for congregational singing. Today, as always, there is considerable controversy within the church over the whole subject of music. History shows us that this is not new or a matter over which we should become unduly alarmed, for the art has always retained a basic position in the church.

A second lesson we should learn is that innovations in the art of music —the renewal of musical speech, grammar, syntax, rhetoric—have come first from the secular branches of the art and only later have become established in sacred music. The past shows us countless examples of composers who worked with the greatest success in both secular and sacred music with an enrichment to their total production. Guillaume de Machaut, leader of poetry and music in the French *Ars Nova* of the 14th century, ending his life as canon of Rheims, produced both his single great Mass (the first complete setting in polyphony by one composer) and his even better known ballades, virelais, and rondeaux. We tend to forget that Claudio Monteverdi, the first genius of opera, was all his life a chapel master in the service of the Church, at first in Mantua and later at St. Marks in Venice. Bach's working conditions never presented him with a chance to write an opera, but the recitatives and arias in his cantatas and Passions derive directly from contemporary Italian operatic models.

One final point concerns our own epoch's relation to similar revolutionary epochs in the history of music. Violent changes in musical style—in the basic views and practices musicians make of melody, rhythm, harmony, and tone color—seem to appear at intervals of about three hundred years. Thus, in fourteenth century France and Italy—the *Ars Nova;* in seventeenth century Florence—*le nuove musiche;* in the twentieth century—*Modern Music,* ranging from Impressionism, Futurism, Dadaism, Expressionism, and others, to Neo-Classicism. In our own time secular music has been evolving fresh approaches to the basic elements of the art. After all, Debussy's *Prelude to the Afternoon of a Faun,* the opening gun of the Impressionist battle, was first heard sixty-five years ago! All too frequently church music in 1957 seems unaware that musical style has undergone revolutionary changes, and church music too often seems to echo styles from the not-sufficiently-distant past.

In past ages the church was often one of the most generous and enlightened patrons of the art of music. In all the arts it is proverbially most difficult to evaluate contemporary work with fairness. Can

not the church again assume this role of patron? Our age needs the universal religious themes interpreted anew with the fresh concepts of tonal beauty our age has produced.

Towards an Awakening in Church Music

I close with a plea for a re-evaluation, a deeper consideration of the possibilities of living music of our own time by the church here and now. For future generations of church members, our children, there are serious consequences ahead if we continue to disregard the musical language of our time. We will lose their respect and interest. We will perpetuate bad associational values of a dull, sentimental nature when we should be providing an emotional climate of depth, vigor, freshness, and sincerity.

How may this be done? There are no simple answers, for the variety of organization in American church life is too varied and complex to permit a central channel of aid. Of paramount necessity, however, is a serious, inquisitive, interested attitude on the part of the officials and congregations. It goes almost without saying that the best professional help available should be sought. Any artist deserves adequate compensation for his efforts—although man has never been able to measure the worth of creative imagination and will in gold! True appreciation and sympathetic human understanding for honest effort and achievement will often be the artist's best compensation.

Is it too bold to hope that there will soon be an awakening in our church music comparable to that in church architecture? Is it even conceivable that a form of church music uniquely fitting to our American situation may be born? I hope these are not impossible goals. Let us all strive to bring about such a day.

III. Religious Drama

E. Martin Browne

Mr. Bachman, in his introduction, set up two fences between which I should like to walk—the one expressed in Dr. Hopper's contention that all poetry is religious and the other in the caution of Thornton Wilder that art should not be didactic. Looking at the art of drama,

we cannot but feel that this is essentially religious, not in virtue of its subject matter, which often is very much the reverse, but in virtue of its nature. Drama consists of one or more persons surrendering the faculties of their own bodies, minds, and, to a large extent, spirits to the creation of other personalities within themselves. This (may I call it) sacrificial aspect of drama is of course basic to primitive religion. Drama is, in fact, the expression of religion for primitive peoples. In the growth of religion in human civilization and human understanding and experience there has naturally been a constant tendency for those who are advancing in religion to fear the expression of the more primitive religion which they are leaving and to be wary of this art just because it is an essentially religious expression. The most recent instance of this is the Reformation and post-Reformation period, when the theatre was almost totally barren in the Protestant community and in Protestant countries. It is only now that the two are beginning to come together again, so that drama may once more be a valid and satisfactory means of expressing religious faith.

In understanding the nature of such expression, if we believe it possible or desirable, we have to remember all the time the essential nature of the art itself—the nature of what the actor does; and I believe too that by that understanding—by that religious understanding—of what the actor does, we can truly evaluate the work of the actor himself. We ask of an actor very consciously and very critically that what he presents to us shall be true in terms of human personality, and what we really mean in asking this is that he should have subordinated himself. He should have given himself as the vehicle, the vessel, of the true expression of the personality he is creating. That is a valid requirement, and it is a religious requirement. And I think that if we have that in mind we can understand something of the relationship that can exist between the drama and the Christian faith.

Explicit and Implicit Christian Drama

I believe that there is and can be a specifically Christian drama—again not starting from the dogmatic or the didactic end, but starting from the nature of the art and of the Christian faith. The core of our faith is the Incarnation—the taking upon Himself of human flesh by almighty God. And this, I suggest in all humility, has a tiny parallel in what the actor does, if he does it rightly.

There is a sense, therefore, in which the Christian faith is more susceptible to interpretation in dramatic terms than any other and in which the Christian "new life" can be presented on the stage as it can be presented in no other way. We can see the new creation

beginning to work—through Christ's incarnation, and His redemptive death and resurrection, and their effect in the renewing of the life of man.

Now if we feel that anything like this is an acceptable point of view, we will agree that there can be and there certainly should be a Christian drama, a drama written by people who hold this faith and who see it working out in the creatures of their creation. This does not mean that the statement of it will be in language which is familiar in church. It may not even mention the name of God. It may not present any of the Christian concepts in such a way that they are recognizable in the course of the drama. But when we look back on the experience we have had in seeing this drama, we shall realize that it has been a Christian experience and could only have happened because of the existence of the Christian faith—and is therefore an expression of this "new life" which we believe to be the goal of our seeking. I would refer to some examples, ancient and modern.

In the Middle Ages the drama was very widely used for the teaching of a largely illiterate population who could not read the Bible, who went to Latin services, and who therefore had to learn through the arts the nature and history of their faith. The most potent of all these arts was the drama. I say that because it has been widely established by scholars in the last twenty years or so that painting, for instance, derived most of its pictorial patterns of Christian subjects from plays, that most medieval pictures of Christian subjects are pictures of scenes in the Mystery or Miracle plays. The plays were done as festivals. They drew the whole population to witness them, as the ancient Greek plays did, and at their height they were performed by the laity in the streets or the great square of the city. They are, of course, explicitly Christian. They are setting forth the history of man from a Christian point of view, but they are setting it forth in terms of human life as understood in their own day and age and society. The people are not ancient Palestinians from far off times; they are the actual shepherds of Wakefield or York or Chester—the actual people who have themselves created the drama. The faith to them is explicit, but it is also immediate.

In contrast, in our modern day the most important drama has been implicit. The drama of writers like T.S. Eliot, Graham Greene, and Christopher Fry has tried to explore the depths of the human situation, not in the spirit of hopelessness which characterizes the work of Sartre or Henri Gheon in France, but in the Christian spirit which believes in the possibility of a "new life". We see through these plays this "new life" progressively emerging. Very often audiences are

puzzled, put off, by the penetrating quality of the study of human beings, by the sordidness of the problems which are presented, but the conclusion is what matters. The Christian author knows that in order to get to resurrection you have to go through death. In this age when Christianity is no longer central, society certainly has to go through death in order to find itself again in the Christian "new life". And so, you get from these authors not only the question which is asked, and valuably asked, by such writers as Tennessee Williams—the question about human life—but also the beginning, at least, of an answer in Christian terms.

The Seminary Program in Religious Drama

During this last semester we have been trying to explore some of these things here at the Seminary. I should like to end by saying a word or two about what has been done and what is in our minds in doing it. We believe that it is possible here both to explore the nature of the relationship between drama and Christianity, and also to do enough about the "how" of presenting drama to equip people to do some valuable work in this field when they leave. These two functions of the Program in Religious Drama are, I think, equally important. I agree profoundly with Dorothy Sayers that there can be no good drama dealing with universal subjects without good theology. The opportunity for exploring the relationship between theology and drama in this creative, active place is a unique one, and I think one which will be valuable to this whole country and perhaps to the whole English-speaking world as it develops.

There is also the necessity to explore the method. Most religious drama used by the Church itself has been in the bad sense "amateur". It has been unskillful, quite out of touch with the very subtle skill which has been developed in the modern art of the theatre. Of course, students here are necessarily amateurs: they are acting as amateurs with no or very little knowledge of the art; they are writing—if they try to write—as amateurs also; their technical accomplishments in the presentation of plays will naturally be amateur, too. But at least they can be given some of the essential background on which to build a knowledge in the course of their ensuing lives; and that side of the program is equally important with the intellectual and theological side.

I feel that possibly here in America, as in Britain, religious drama may in fact turn out to be important to the art of the theatre as an art. Looking back over the last twenty-five years, the Christians have marched in the vanguard of British drama. In 1935 T .S. Eliot wrote "Murder

in the Cathedral" for performance in the Chapter House at Canterbury. It was a revolution in play-making. Since then, many plays have been written for use in the Church which have introduced new forms into the theatre. The revival of verse-drama in England, which has given the modern poets their most fruitful form of popular expression, has been almost entirely due to the Church. The vividness, the vivacity of the Christian statement made by people like Eliot, Fry, Sayers, and Charles Williams, has made a profound impression on the theatrical as well as the theological situation. It seems to me entirely possible that something similar might happen in this country in the next few years. I feel that it is not only a great privilege to have been associated with the beginning of this course at the Seminary, but also a great opportunity to lay at least some foundations for what I believe to be a future of great importance both for art and for Christianity.

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The Modern Hindu Attitude Toward Christian Evangelism

P. D. Devanandan

The possibility of genuine religious conversion from one faith to another has always puzzled Hindu leaders. Today, many Hindu nationalists feel that such conversion should be prevented, if possible, by state action. The suggestion has considerable popular support, especially as a defense measure against the evangelistic activities of the Christian Church. From the early days of Protestant Missions in India, both popular sentiment and the considered opinion of religious leaders expressed disapproval of conversion from Hinduism to Christianity.

Even as early as 1815, one of the most friendly Hindu leaders of the day, Ram Mohan Roy, registered vigorous protest: "If by force of argument missionaries can prove the truth of their own religion and the falsity of that of Hindus, many would of course embrace their doctrines. In case they fail to prove this, they should not undergo such useless trouble, nor tease Hindus any longer by their attempts at conversion." Nearly a century later, Mahatma Gandhi, who had been himself no less profoundly influenced by Christianity, is reported to have stated: "If I had the power and could legislate, I should certainly stop all proselytizing. It is the cause of much avoidable conflict between classes and unnecessary heart-burning among missionaries." More recently, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the President of the Indian Republic, declared: "Missionaries would be given full freedom to preach Christianity and to do other kinds of social service to the population of India, but none of these activities should be inspired by any desire for conversion. It is a different thing to convert."

This fear undoubtedly provided the motive for the government of the Madhya Pradesh state to set up a semi-official committee to investigate Christian missionary activities. The Report of that Enquiry has been recently published. "The separatist tendency that has gripped the mind of the aboriginals under the influence of the Lutheran and Roman Catholic missions is entirely due to the consistent policy pursued by the British Government and the missionaries. The final segregation of the aborigines in the Census of 1931 from the main body of the Hindus considered along with the recommendations of the Simon Commission which were incorporated in the Government of India Act 1935 apparently set the stage for the demand of a separate state of Jharkhand on the lines of Pakistan . . . This attempt of the Adiwasis (aboriginals) initiated by the Christian section thereof is a feature which is common to the developments in Burma, Assam and Indo-China among the Karens, Nagas and Amboynes. This is attributed to the spirit of religious nationalism awakened among the converted Christians as among the followers of other religions."

From about the 12th to the 18th century a considerable part of India was subject to Moslem rule. Moslem rulers, with few exceptions, were intolerant of Hinduism and they considered it their religious duty to encourage the conversion of large sections of their Hindu subjects to Islam. Such change of faith was often made at the point of the sword, and not always in consequence of a change of convictions. The big Moslem population in British India consisted in the main of such converts. On the eve of independence they successfully split the sub-continent of India into the new state of Pakistan and what is now known as India. The division was effected on the principle of religion. This fact, which is of recent history, and the memory of the violence and bloodshed which marred the partition-incident, are so painful to recall that the Hindu attitude to conversion has become embittered and irrational.

Political Objections to Conversion

In the days of the British Raj, although the Government pursued a policy of strict neutrality in matters concerning religion, they gave ground to the Hindu suspicion that they favored Moslems and Christians. Hindu leaders attributed the rapid spread of Christianity through mass movement conversions, resulting in the growth of a strong Christian section of the Indian population numbering nearly ten million after a century of missionary activity, to the friendly support given unofficially by the Government to Christian Missions. Moreover, when the British government introduced the prinicple of communal representation, whereby representation in governmental institutions and the holding of office in

various services were to be determined by the religious community to which one belonged, there ensued a rivalry among the different communities in pressing their claims. This, in turn, led to communal conflicts which prevented the growth of a sense of national unity. In the days of the nationalist struggle for independence non-Hindu religious minorities did not lend adequate support. Indian Christians, in particular, gave room for suspicion about their loyalty to the Indian National Congress. Even after Independence, the tendency to communalism persists. The Sikhs, for instance, are demanding a state which they might call their own. Some national leaders therefore hold that conversion would perpetuate communalism, and fear that if the growth in population of religious minorities in India is not checked it might lead to further political division of the Indian people on the basis of religion.

Almost the first thing the national government did was to give up the principle of communal representation and actively discourage the growth of purely communal organizations and institutions. Free India set for itself the ideal of a secular state declaring that although nearly 85% of its population consisted of professing Hindus, India was not to be regarded as a Hindu state. The policy of the government, it was maintained, would be to make no discrimination on the basis of religion. The Constitution decreed that every one shall have the freedom to profess, practice and propagate religion, provided it did not entail any breach of law and order.

This political ideal of the secular state and this constitutional guarantee of religious freedom are, however, both new and strange to the Hindu mind. Especially in view of the fact that it has been taken for granted all along that everything truly Indian is Hindu, and that underlying all religious tolerance is the characteristic Hindu conviction that all religions lead to the same goal. As a matter of fact, the secular state in India is threatened by *three* reactionary Hindu political parties —the Jan Sangh, which polled over 3 million votes, 3% of the total in the last general election in 1952; the Ram Rajya Parishad, which secured nearly 2 million, almost 2% of the total poll; and the Hindu Mahasabha which won about one million votes, 1% of the total. These political parties do not hesitate to admit that their avowed purpose is to protect Hinduism and to safeguard the rights of the Hindus as against other religious minorities. The attitude of these Hindu communalists is expressed in a statement issued by one of their leaders. "Apart from the serious and harmful reactions which have occurred, and will occur, whenever religious conversions have been forced or even induced by material gifts, we have not yet risen to the higher levels of religious and cultural changes and interchanges. This is due to the fact that many are still prepared to take advantage of man's infirmities, his material

needs and sufferings in their propaganda for a change in religious affiliations. Also, the hiring of others to carry on religious propaganda is widespread. Above all, they not only make absolute claims for their own particular cultural and religious traditions, but insist that others also accept these claims. Such actions and claims have pulled down conversions to the levels of the market place and of the conflicts for power and aggrandisement. These must, therefore, be fully avoided for the peaceful coexistence of the communities following the great religious traditions and for the cultivation of mutual reverence among them."

Religious Objections to Conversion

Besides, the Hindu has a definite religious objection to conversion. From the standpoint of Hindu religious orthodoxy, it is pointed out that religious conversion is not always genuine and lasting; in any case, it is unnecessary and futile. It is not genuine because the Hindu holds that there can be no such radical change in religious convictions as to compel a convert to change over from one religion to another. The Hindu may not question the validity of the conversion experience, but he seriously doubts whether every convert from Hinduism to Christianity experiences such a total and conscious change of convictions as to take this decisive step of breaking completely away from his ancestral faith—especially because such a migration is unnecessary, according to him. Hinduism itself provides for a great variety of beliefs, and is always willing to accommodate within its vast fold people who accept all sorts of religious belief and practice, however contradictory or inconsistent. Moreover, according to the Hindu critic, conversion does not seem to result in any visible or lasting spiritual change, where most people are concerned. Such changes may be true in the case of a few individuals, but by the large the visible change is that a convert is denationalized; culturally and socially he is a displaced person; his loyalty is suspect, because his association now is with alien people from whom he gets material help.

Of more recent times, however, Hindu leaders take the position that Christian evangelistic work may be tolerated if the intention is to convert and not to proselytize. This concession is suggested on the basis of two assumptions: that genuine conversions are few and far between; and that proselytism is associated with unworthy motives and unfair methods. It also takes for granted that conversion is one thing and proselytism quite another; that they are in a way mutually contradictory, the one ruling out the other. Underlying this Hindu distinction between conversion and proselytism is the Hindu religious theory that while a convert may undoubtedly experience a change of

heart, of varying degrees of intensity, such change of convictions does not drive him out of his ancestral religious home and social *milieu* to seek refuge and nurture elsewhere for spiritual self-development. The proselyte, on the other hand, it is pointed out, is blown off his feet by high-powered propaganda, and is persuaded by methods and means not always beyond question to come out of Hinduism and attach himself to the Christian Church. The proselyte's own personal motives are also unworthy.

On the face of it, both this Hindu understanding of the difference between conversion and proselytism, and the plea that we evangelize but not proselytize, appear reasonable. So much so, that many Christians in India, both national and non-national, are today inclined to agree, for various reasons. There are some who feel that the task of evangelism does not consist in calling for decision on the issue of joining the Church. At one extreme are those who are convinced that evangelism means only carrying the Gospel, merely proclaiming the good news. Once we have conveyed the glad information, our duty is over, and any attempt to persuade men to act on the glad information would be proselytism. But this appears much too simple a solution. For the Gospel is not mere information; it is an offer—an offer of salvation. And evangelism is presenting the challenge of this offer to men in all its reality and importance so that a decision is called for—to accept or reject the offer. Therefore it is inevitable that in all evangelism there is also a desire to win converts. And in Christian evangelism conversion and proselytism are not so completely different as they are made out to be by Hindu leaders.

Again, whereas to the Hindu way of thinking it is possible for the Hindu to be converted to the Christian faith and to remain a Hindu, to the Christian way of thinking that is utterly impossible. When a Hindu talks about a Hindu becoming a Christian by faith, he is thinking of accepting desirable elements of the Christian creed, torn out of context from the entire total setting. For instance, the Hindu would consider it quite possible to accept sincerely the Christian ethic, the Sermon on the Mount, the religious example of Jesus himself, the Christian understanding of particular religious values like social justice, worth of the human individual and the upbuilding of the community—and remain a Hindu. From the Hindu point of view such addition of foreign religious elements to the original core of the Hindu religious creed is possible. It is not so to the Christian. For what does really happen in all such "syncretism," even within Hinduism, is that what is taken over and adopted, either in part or in whole, comes to be conditioned by and subordinated to the basic fundamentals of faith which provide the creedal core. It would not be possible for a Hindu, if he continues to

be a Hindu, to accept the claims of the absolute lordship of Jesus Christ in his personal life, for that would be to bring everything else under the judgment of Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour. It would not be possible, again, to continue to be a Hindu and accept the Christian teaching about the Church, which again is a fundamental of the Christian creed.

Therefore, when a Hindu claims that it is possible for a Hindu to accept the Christian faith and continue to be a Hindu, he means accepting not the Christian faith as the Christian understands it, but the Chrisian faith as the Hindu would have it to be. Obviously, it is unfair for the Hindu to take upon himself the responsibility of telling the Christian what Christianity really is and what it stands for. No more has the Christian the right to tell Hindus what Hinduism is. Of course, any Hindu has the freedom to interpret Christianity in any way he likes. He also has the freedom to convert Hindus to his point of view, if he can make them accept such a Hinduized version of Christianity. But for any Hindu to maintain that his interpretation of Christian fundamentals is the *only* right understanding of the Christian position is improper, to say the least.

In any case, it will follow that if Hindus were to succeed in winning converts of a number of Indian Christians to such a creedal position, they also would be making proselytes. For such Hindu converts from Christianity who accept a Hinduized version of Christianity would want to go over from the Christian Church, and out of it, into either Hinduism itself, or some half-way house such as the Brahmo *Samaj*, or the Theosophical Society, or some sort of a Christo *Samaj*.

The Affinity of Proselytism and Conversion

In the real sense of that term, then, proselytism has close affinity with religious conversion. So much so that to convert would be also to proselytize: the one leads to the other. But if proselytism is taken to mean merely making people change their religious affiliation either by coercion or by persuasion, with the intention only of increasing the numbers of adherents of any religious group, then proselytism is not only undesirable but it deserves to be condemned as unworthy. The condemnation would apply both to the motive which animates proselytizing activities as well as to the methods which are employed.

What is the motive? In proselytism the motive is primarily self-glorification, getting people to join us, our party, our creed. It has been well said that "in its best form proselytism is the effort to get men to join our party because it is ours. In its worst form, it is the effort to get men to join our party because we ourselves believe it to be the right party." It is in the source from which the constraint is felt that

evangelism differs utterly from proselytism, i.e., in its motives rather than in its methods. Only by keeping our motive right can we protect ourselves from letting our endeavor to evangelize degenerate into proselytizing, and our preaching into propaganda.

Without being pharisaical, the Christian in India might well remind Hindu leaders that they are in fact in great danger of mistaking proselytism for conversion, if the motive is nationalism in some form or another, even as the Christian evangelist is in similar danger if the motive is "too exclusively humanitarian—too much a desire to rescue men from what is bad for them, and to win them to what is good for them."

The charge about unfair methods of coercion and of persuasion which is associated with proselytism needs to be met with patience and sympathy. The memory of the tragic incidents of earlier history persists in the minds of the more ardent Hindu nationalists, and makes it difficult for them to realize that conversions can occur by free decision of individuals. We may not deny that a goodly number of Hindus were forced to become Moslems in the days of the Moslem power in India. Some of the Western powers of the eighteenth century were also inclined to encourage such forced conversions of their Hindu subjects. But what rankles in their memory is the fact that in many cases of simple village Christian converts the decision was made by individuals in groups. They refuse to admit that such mass-action can possibly have resulted from voluntary decision based on rational grounds. It was the appeal of a better life, the lure of a higher status, the offer of the protection and care of a community—these decided the choice of the convert from mass movement areas. Here again the Christian position has to be stated more fully. The appeal of Christianity is not to the mind alone, but to the total man. Christianity, when it dawns upon a man, is a new doctrine and a new life, both interwoven. It makes its appeal as such. It is a doctrine which is also an ideal, and a plane of personality, and a fellowship, and a revelation of love; and therefore it cannot express itself in word alone, but it must also speak in personality and deed and society. And it must speak to all—to the very humble and simple men who may not be able to follow abstruse reasonings and comparisons, but who can love a person and dedicate themselves to a way of life, and find God thus far more deeply than before.

The Christian Responsibility

The immediate future of the Church in India depends on our establishing the freedom of the individual in India to make unhindered decision in the matter of religious conversion and to take whatever action he

may feel impelled to take in regard to it. This assumes, of course, that such action would not in any way jeopardize public peace and order. Also that such freedom is for all individuals of every religious group in the country. A Christian or a Moslem in India should be free, for instance, to change his faith and become a Hindu if he feels so convinced. Christians must not complain if Hindus also campaign for converts and set up organized agencies for aggressive propagation of Hinduism among Christian folk. If such protest is voiced by other than Indian Christians and directed against Hindu leaders, it is apt to create a situation which is frequently given a political construction, shifting the controversy from the area of religious freedom to that of international relations. We must not forget that the more frequent charge against Christian evangelism is that it is anti-national—not merely in the sense that it is directed against the interests of the nation, but in the sense that it is directed, executed and financed by foreign missionaries. The restriction on the entry of foreign missionaries is on this score, in great measure. Hindu national leaders have repeatedly expressed the view that they have no objection if evangelistic work is under the direction of Indian Christians themselves.

In order to prevent the central issue of the right to conversion from being sidetracked, some drastic changes in our strategy need to be made. One such change would be increasingly to utilize foreign missionary personnel for responsibilities directly concerned with the up-building and strengthening of the Church and the Christian community. This would not mean that the foreign co-worker is immobilized from the field of active evangelism but that his Christian witness would inform the total witness of the local Christian community, and that the evangelistic concern would be assumed by the entire Church and not delegated to any one department of it as the specialized activity of a silent few. Further, it would demonstrate more powerfully than any mere statement of policy that the Christian fellowship is truly supranational and in a real sense ecumenical. Another change that is called for is to make our foreign personnel as widely representative as possible of Christian co-workers from all sections of the World Church and not confine our choice to those from the Older Churches, so called. This would not only show that the Christian concern in evangelism is the local expression of a world-wide witness, but also dispel the fear that behind it lurks the danger of foreign control of either any one people or a group of people. A third change would be in regard to our programme of service projects which are now being carried out as part of our evangelistic task. It would be necessary to make it clear that these are undertaken as ends in themselves and not as means to an end. The Hindu appreciates and respects the Christian motivation which inspires these good

works. What he objects to is making use of them as strategy for winning converts. This charge cannot be sustained, it is true. But to withdraw from the field of social service, as some Christian leaders suggest, would be only to admit guilt, especially in view of the fact that the need for service in education, community welfare, medical aid and the like is greater than ever before, and in view also of the fact that secular organizations are now giving generous assistance in carrying out these projects.

Towards a Creative Conversation Between Hindu and Christian

In the second place, it is time now for Indian Christians as representing the Christian Church in India to enter into a conversation with Hindu leaders on this crucial issue. There is reason in the plea that is sometimes put forward by the Hindu that the Christian evangelist owes him an explanation. So this conversation has to be initiated by us. For all these many years of apologetics and counter-apologetics, there has been no real confrontation of Christianity and Hinduism. We are entering a period in Church history in India when such an encounter is needed. Any theology of missions which is to furnish an adequate basis for presenting the Christian message should take full account of the challenge of the living faith of non-Christian creeds, and their claims to contemporary human needs. The Christian missionary obligation, therefore, has to be fulfilled in the context of a human situation for which there are others who also claim to have an answer.

At the moment in India the conversation between the Hindu and the Christian should focus attention on at least four points. The first of these would be the radical difference between the Hindu conception of religious tolerance and the Christian idea of religious liberty. The former is based upon the assumption that all religions lead to the same goal in the end, and that no one of them can claim to be in any sense unique or absolute. They are all but relatively true and to that extent, also all relatively untrue. Therefore, religious tolerane would be accommodative, permitting easy commerce among religiously minded people. This point of view was expressed at the Fourth Annual meeting of the Fellowship of the Friends of Truth which met in New Delhi in September 1954 in a public statement which reads: "If in the political field it is necessary to find a basis for coexistence for differing ideologies, how much greater is the need and the possibility of finding such a basis for coexistence in the religious field! Nay, there must be a basis on which the great religions can not only co-exist, but should be able to contribute from their great insights and heritages to the common growth of man to a fuller and richer life . . . Our plea is for a new reverence

for all religions, for the opening of windows all round, that the light from each may shine upon all, helping man to a complete understanding of the truth within, and guiding us all together to a fuller realization of the Life Abundant."

The second point which needs to be elucidated refers to the legitimate desire in New India for cultural unification. And culture has its roots in religion. The Christianization of India, it is feared, will lead in the end to the rooting out of Indian culture. It must be granted that Hindus form the major part of the Indian population, and that their culture is the most influential in national life. But we may not forget in India that our national culture is not to be confused with a particular religious culture, in this case Hindu culture. Indian culture at present is a composition to which Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, Islam and Christianity have made their contributions. Western secular culture has also had a considerable influence on present-day Indian life

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and thought. As for the Indian Christian himself, it must repeatedly be urged in the future that "there should be now a more conscious effort to free Christianity in India from unnatural manners and customs derived from contacts with the West, and to express the religious faith and life through a living Indian medium."

The third point, in this connection, would be a determined effort to clarify the meaning and functions of the secular state which is India's ideal. Nevertheless, some confusion of thought among national leaders has become apparent in the pronouncements they have made on the secular state, particularly in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution relating to the practice and propagation of religion. Moreover, the intentions of the government do not find correct implementation at lower levels of administration, resulting frequently in acts of intolerance of minority religious groups. And at this local level there is need for a clearer understanding of the full implications of the secular, democratic state, especially as they relate to the Government, as distinguished from the State.

The fourth topic for conversation is furnished by the term "propagation." Article 25 in Part III of the Indian Constitution begins with the statement "subject to public order, morality and health—all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion." This idea of propagating religion is something new to Hindu India. Unlike Buddhism, Hinduism never believed in it, although it is now beginning to think in terms of a world outreach with a message of hope in the Vedanta. Historically, Hinduism expanded by a process of absorption, steadily spreading out to include all types of religious beliefs and practices as far out as modern Indonesia, but it was not in terms of any conscious effort to propagate the faith. Only with the beginning of the twentieth century of our era is there a noticeable change in the Hindu attitude in regard to propagation of religion. It first finds expression in an effort to recover those who had gone out of Hinduism. Such activities are necessarily confined to India. At the moment, Hindu religious leaders are actively engaged in including within the larger whole of Hinduism all tribal religions of the hills in Assam, Madhya, Pradesh and other tribal areas, by simply declaring that such tribal religions also form part of Hinduism and should be left untouched by, and protected from, Christian evangelists. So that to the Hindu the term "propagation" would simply mean group consolidation motivated by a desire for self-preservation. To a people with such a conception of religion the Christian urge for propagation of the faith is a menace to ordered living.

Finally, Christians in India should discover ways and means of widening the circles of local Christian fellowship to include Hindus as well,

should they desire to come in. Surely there is a kind of creative fellowship which can be qualitatively Christian, though quantitatively it may be composed largely of non-Christians. After all, the ultimate good we seek in Christian unity is the vital communion of responsible persons which is productive of spiritual experience, so transforming the present that it is shot through with eternal values in the here and now. If we so dare and, without compromising our faith, venture beyond the pale of theological security, we can establish vital contact with Hindus in the spirit and example of our Lord himself. And such personal relationship and witness can go a long way in dispelling fear and prejudice which seem to be, in the last count, the real forces which create the present situation in India.

In Memoriam

JAMES EVERETT FRAME

[The following minute for Dr. Frame was submitted to the Faculty by Dr. Cyril C. Richardson, Director of Graduate Studies, on February 13, 1957.]

In the passing of James Everett Frame, Baldwin Professor Emeritus of Sacred Literature, on December 30, 1956, the Seminary mourns the loss of one of its most rigorous scholars, incisive teachers, and devoted friends.

Dr. Frame was born in Boston on March 24, 1868, and graduated from Harvard University, A.B. 1891, A.M. 1892. He attended the Seminary from 1892 to 1895, graduating with the B.D. degree and being awarded the travelling fellowship. He continued his theological studies in the Universities of Berlin and Göttingen (1895-1897), and was appointed Instructor in New Testament at the Seminary in 1897. From that date until his retirement in 1938, his life was spent in the Seminary's service. He quickly rose through the junior ranks and was elected Professor of New Testament Theology in 1904 at the early age of 36. Transferred the following year to the Edward Robinson Professorship, he was finally elected to the Baldwin Professorship in 1919. He was the first Secretary of the Faculty Socials which were begun in 1901, and for many years, until his retirement, served as Chairman of the Worship Committee. He regularly conducted the Sunday Services in the James Chapel composing prayers in a style which combined traditional gravity with theological precision and refinement of expression.

He faithfully served the Presbyterian Church throughout his life, having been ordained by the Presbytery of Boston in 1898.

His scholarly attainments won him the honorary doctorate (S.T.D.) from Havard University in 1913, and a fellowship in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Although his literary output was small, it was eminently distinguished. A favored pupil and colleague of Charles Augustus Briggs, he was

chosen by him to write the Commentary on Thessalonians for the I.C.C., and this work, perhaps more than any other, turned the tide in the recognition of II Thessalonians as an authentic work of St. Paul. It quickly became a standard study of Pauline theology and its influence on German, no less than English speaking, scholarship was noteworthy. His study of "Paul's Idea of Deliverance" (J.B.L. 49, 1930) and his inaugural address, "The Purpose of New Testament Theology" (1905), equally revealed a penetrating and well-informed mind.

Two years after his retirement he delivered the Morse Lectures (1940) on "Paul's Idea of Sin and Deliverance", in which he brought to bear the concentrated study and reflection of a life-time.

In the classroom Dr. Frame was precise and rigorous. His lectures were always prepared with the utmost care; and his devotion to the cause of truth and to unbiased investigation was his most evident characteristic. He was a warm friend to those who were willing to embrace the claims of unfettered and serious scholarship, and the ripeness of his judgment is reflected in many doctoral theses done under his direction. It was once remarked to him, "Why do you not write a book on Faith in St. Paul?" To which he retorted: "Why should I? I have said all I have to say on that subject in Mr. So-and-so's thesis!"

Dr. Frame is survived by his widow, Jean Herring Loomis Frame, and their three children, Sutherland, Dorothy and Donald. The Faculty of the Seminary extends to them their deep sympathy in their bereavement, and their sorrow at the loss of so distinguished and beloved a colleague.

LEWIS JOSEPH SHERRILL

[The following prayer was offered by Reinhold Niebuhr, Vice-President of Union Seminary, at the memorial service for Dr. Sherrill held in James Memorial Chapel on February 6. Dr. Sherrill, who was Skinner and McAlpin Professor of Practical Theology, passed away on January 28.]

Our Father, before whom a thousand years are but as yesterday when it is past and as a watch in the night, we, who bring our years to an end like a tale that it told, worship thee, who art from everlasting to everlasting. Thou redeemest our life from destruction and crownest us with loving kindness and tender mercies. We thank thee that though our years are brief, thou savest our life from vanity by making us co-workers together with thee. Thou art our creator and redeemer. Thy power and thy love gather up our fragmentary lives in thy total plan and complete our incompleteness by the forgiveness of our sins and life everlasting. We praise thee, for that we are fearfully and wonderfully made and that thy love redeems us from the misery of sin and death in which our grandeur is hidden, through him who brought life and immortality to light, even Christ our Lord.

We praise thee, our Father, for all the saints who have departed this life in thy fear and favor, whose faithfulness has nourished the faith of thy church, whose love fulfilled thy law and channeled thy grace to men, and by whose witness the gospel of Christ was made known to men. We praise thee for the noble living and dead and for the whole company of saints who compass us about as a cloud of witnesses and help us to run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus the author and finisher of our faith.

We give thee thanks this day particularly for thy servant, Lewis Sherrill, who has been taken from our company to be with thee. In our sorrow and grief, we remember with gratitude all thy grace which was mediated through him. We thank thee for the quiet dignity of his spirit and for the unpretentious goodness which rebuked our vanities and brought us to our true selves. We remember the uncomplaining patience with which he bore his physical infirmities and out of weakness was made strong. We thank thee for his love; and his learning which made his love rich in all knowledge and discernment, particularly in the discernment of the human heart, with

its follies, foibles and nobilities and its infinite striving. Endow this company of thy faithful with the grace of that loving discernment, that the memory of his life may be a benediction among us.

O God, the Lord over life and death, God of all comfort, we pray particularly for those who shared his life intimately and are so grievously stricken by this great loss: for his children and for her who was the partner of his life. Visit her with thy grace and in her lonely hours sustain her by the blessed memories of shared joys and sorrows of their life together, and by the blessed hopes, which we have as disciples of the risen Lord.

O Lord, make our lives rich in those things of which death cannot rob us and renew our faith that neither life nor death, nor principalities and powers, nor height nor depth nor things present nor things to come, will be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

Book Reviews

THE IDEA OF REVELATION IN RECENT THOUGHT, BY JOHN BAILLIE. *New York, Columbia University Press, 1956. 151 pp., $3.00.*

In these Bampton lectures delivered at Columbia University in 1954 Dr. Baillie has given an extraordinarily wise and concise interpretation of the meaning of revelation. His thesis is that "a new and better understanding of the meaning of revelation is beginning to emerge" which more truly expresses the Biblical meaning than either Catholic or Protestant orthodoxy has succeeded in doing. Revelation is the disclosure of the personal God to persons, not the communication of truth in the form of propositions. It comes through events and involves the intercourse of event and interpretation. But the reality is in the divine self disclosure, it is not to be identified with the words or images in which men try to express the reality.

The argument is developed first through a swift but admirably discerning review of the development of the concept of revelation from the medieval church down to the modern period. Dr. Baillie then turns to contemporary Protestant and Anglican theology and draws heavily upon Barth, Brunner, and especially William Temple, and also upon two earlier theologians, Frederic Maurice and John Flavel. The quotations from the latter, a Puritan theologian of the 17th century, on the meaning of faith as acceptance are of special interest and we are in Dr. Baillie's debt for making them available.

The view which Dr. Baillie appears to defend is closest to that of Emil Brunner, I should judge. Everything in Scripture and tradition is to be understood as derivative from and witness to the personal confrontation of man by God. Revelation comes as demand, and the response through which alone revelation may be appropriated is personal faith which is an appreciative and faithful obedience to the divine command, and a reception of the divine grace.

This position makes possible a sharp differentiation between the word of Scripture and the content of revelation, while the place of the Bible as the central and authoritative witness to the decisive events of revelation is preserved. (One regrets, by the way, that Dr. Baillie labels the view that *some* of the words of Scripture are inerrant as "modernist". This is hardly the view generally identified with modernism).

The statement of the idea of revelation is convincing and Dr. Baillie is skillful in drawing together many strands of contemporary theology, showing the large measure of common understanding, though he also makes judicious criticisms of some tendencies in Barth and Austin Farrer's views.

Dr. Baillie confines himself in this brief book to the "idea" of revelation. Two questions remain in the mind of the reader. One concerns the nature of "subject to subject" disclosure. There is a tendency in present theology to treat the "I-Thou" relationship as if in itself it answered all the fundamental questions about man's knowledge of God. But it seems to this reviewer that our knowledge of other selves involves a profound mystery; and that "personal encounter" raises questions as well as providing answers. The questions that Dr. Tillich, for example, has posed concerning the application of the category of personality to God need to be faced more realistically.

If we grant that knowledge is given in no simple way through personal encounter then we come back to the problem of truth. How do we know that a given interpretation of revelation is valid? The Catholic emphasis on the structure of truth in revelation cannot be lightly dismissed. Other faiths claim other revelations through which God is described differently. Does revelation itself adjudicate between rival claims? These tensions internal to the Christian idea of revelation itself need to be further explored; but Dr. Baillie has here given an eminently readable and profound introduction to contemporary theological thought.

DANIEL D. WILLIAMS

SPECULATION IN PRE-CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, BY RICHARD KRONER. *Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1956. 251 pages, $5.75.*

The meaning of the past, indeed the historical facts themselves change with the point of view of the historian. This opinion, so familiar today as to be almost a truism, is seldom explicitly acknowledged by the historian himself, however uneasy it may make him privately. But Richard Kroner boldly asserts that history is not and cannot be an objective science. The vantage point from which Professor Kroner surveys the history of philosophy is the relation of speculative reason to religious revelation. The present volume is the first of three, which are to bear the general title of *Speculation and Revelation in the History of Philosophy*. In ancient Greek philosophy speculation was independent of revelation; in mediaeval ("Roman Catholic") philosophy speculation depended on revelation; and in the modern "Protestant" era the two have again been separated, with revelation usually subordinated to speculation.

Speculation, as Kroner understands it (we are promised a fourth work in which the theme will be defended and developed systematically), is man's attempt to understand ultimate reality by rational contemplation. Although it is radically opposed to revelation, there is a point of contact: "The religious and the speculative Ultimate are in the final analysis the same Absolute." Further, speculation itself begins with a "quasi-revelatory" factor, an imaginative intuition, which it seeks to understand by critical analysis.

Despite its freedom from revelation, indeed because of it Kroner argues, Greek philosophy paved the way for reception of the Christian revelation. "Only the Greeks could seek to discover by intuition and reasoning the limits to which the human mind can go in unveiling the hidden truth of the divine. While capable of destroying popular religion, this most admirable adventure, however, could not create a better one. Thus it had to fail in the end." The fundamental attitude of the Greeks (here as elsewhere Kroner agrees with Hegel) was throughout that of aesthetic imagination and contemplation. The basic aesthetic intuition of nature as a harmonious whole was subjected to ever more penetrating analysis from Thales to the Stoics in the effort to find a single invisible principle that would be morally as well as theoretically satisfying. Socrates, "the most

Christian figure in the pre-Christian pagan world," discovered the depths of the human soul, and though his "existential inwardness" approached most nearly to the mystery of being which only revelation can properly make known. In Plato Socratic religious awe and moral seriousness combined with the speculative ontology of Parmenides to produce the transcendent world of Ideas (Kroner will not call them "forms") and the nearly theistic conception of a divine creator. Aristotle, more typically Greek than Plato in subordinating the moral to the aesthetic, discovered a more personal deity than Plato's. But Plato was still Greek enough to think of reality as a single, orderly, beautiful whole, and Aristotle's cosmic mind was a part of the universe and not yet a self or person.

A perspective may indeed give meaning; inevitably it must produce some distortion. What, for example, is one to make of a history in which less than two pages are devoted to the Atomists ("from the perspective of the history of philosophy they are the least outstanding and remarkable") and the Epicureans are not accorded a single word? What should one think of an interpretation of Plato that dismisses in three sentences the influence of the Pythagoreans? Or of a perspective that lays emphasis on Aristotle's theology, after Jaeger's view is apparently accepted that *Metaphysics* XII is a comparatively youthful effort about which Aristotle had later misgivings? Could it be that, while philosophy is assuredly not identical with science, still it has an affinity with science no less intimate though no less puzzling than it has with religion? Still, Professor Kroner's intepretation should go far in introducing a most valuable corrective to the currently fashionable treatment of Greek thought as the progessive approximation to modern science. Both the reflective religious man and the philosopher must be grateful for this.

JEAN A. POTTER

CHURCH DOGMATICS, VOL. I THE DOCTRINE OF THE WORD OF GOD (PROLEGOMENA TO CHURCH DOGMATICS) PART 2, BY KARL BARTH, TR. G. T. THOMSON AND HAROLD KNIGHT. *New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956. XIV. 905 pp., $12.50.* [ED. NOTE: *This review is one of a series which deal with both this book and Barth's place in contemporary thought more generally. A review by Professor John C. Bennett appeared in the January issue of the* Quarterly Review. *A subsequent discussion will be printed in the May issue.*]

It is now some forty years since Karl Barth, a young Swiss minister, found himself facing his congregation with nothing more to say than what he had been taught by his teachers. He soon realized that he had exhausted his resources and that the hungry sheep looked up but were not fed. In desperation he cried out, like many before and after him, "What shall I preach?", and finally was driven to confess, "Thou God, art God alone." Perhaps few of us today recall the electric shock which went through the theological world when his first books, *The Word of God and the Word of Man* and the *Commentary to the Romans,* appeared. They came like a blast of cold northern air into the tepid and miasmic climate of the twenties. I recall vividly the day I picked up a small volume by Thurneysen and Barth, *Come, Creator Spirit,* during my student days at Marburg and the profound effect it exerted on me. For Barth was witnessing in a new way to the majesty and sovereignty of an Absolute Lord, to the Word of God addressed to the Church, and to the apostasy of modern Christendom. Many of the things he had to say about experience and history were a grievous offence to a generation which had long been nourished by historicism and a theology of personal experience. While Barth himself later tempered the vehemence of his polemic, his attacks have produced a salutary effect upon contemporary theological thought, even,

indeed, when it does not recognize the source of this influence.

Barth's *Christian Dogmatics* is an impressive work: vast in its range, imposing in its architectonics, and superbly wrought in its composition. It is clear that the whole work has been carefully conceived: the major sections are finely ordered, and the sub-sections are beautifully articulated into the larger units. Paragraphs and sentences and, indeed, the structure and form of the sentences, have been fashioned with care and consistency. Barth always writes with a profound sense of responsibility to the theological enterprise; he is subservient to the Word of God which he seeks to understand and to interpret for the Church. His learning is prodigious. The Apostolic and Church Fathers, the Reformers, philosophers and theologians, many of them obscure, are quoted from their original sources and frequently in their own tongue. Entirely aside from his own elaborate discussions, his work is a mine of innumerable quotations drawn from the history of Christian thought and doctrine and from the great philosophers. It is his *Auseinandersetzung* with scores of thinkers in the Church that gives special force to his own theology.

One section of this second volume in the doctrine of the Word of God is appropriately devoted to "the time of revelation": God's time and our time, the time of expectation in the Old Testament, and the time of recollection in the New. "God has time for us," he says in his characteristic epigrammatic way, and this time is real in his revelation. God created time, but this must not be identified with the order of creation. The time we think we possess and know must not be equated with God's time, for 'our time' is fallen time, "lost, fallen, and condemned time." (p. 49) Not least of all when one is most inclined to challenge him, Barth argues persuasively and always on the basis of exegesis of the relevant texts. He might have made an even better case if he had appealed to the Deuteronomic historians, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel for the persistence of 'fallen' time. Instead he appeals to *Genesis* 3:23f. and 6:5f. To speak of the whole Old Testament as 'fallen' time, however, is to speak too abstractly, too 'dogmatically', and, indeed, too unbiblically. Not only does the Old Testament make nothing of the fall after *Genesis* 3, as Barth must be well aware, but there are not a few passages which would contradict the dogma. The Old Testament is the time of expectation. It is surely true that expectation is frequently a major reality of biblical faith, but Barth, as not infrequently elsewhere, understands it too unilinearly, and he relates it altogether too simply to the fulfilment in the unique 'time' of revelation in Jesus Christ. There may be a sense in which one could say that the Old Testament 'witnesses' to Christ, but such a statement requires a different kind of defence and understanding from that which Barth gives to us. Again, it is too 'dogmatically' affirmed. Barth is right in saying that the God of the Old Testament is not timeless; he is the covenant God of Israel revealing himself in time. (p. 66) [The exegesis of *Psalm* 90:4 is excellent, including Luther's words on the text.]

The long chapter on "Holy Scripture" is divided into three sections: "The Word of God for the Church," "Authority in the Church," and "Freedom in the Church." Whatever may be said of some of Barth's followers, the Word of God for him is never an abstraction or a stereotype. Holy Scripture is *witness* of God's revelation. In the Bible we hear human words spoken in human speech, yet they are the vehicle of divine revelation. This human character of biblical speech, indeed all human speaking and hearing, is profoundly grasped and of the first importance for dealing with the hermeneutical problem. Barth resists every attempt to shift from the role of hearer to the role of observer, especially dis-

passionate observer. This is not to do justice to the speaker, whether in the Bible or in everyday human relationships. "Understanding of a human word presupposes that the attempt to speak and to hear has succeeded. . . . It is only in the light of what is said to me and heard by me, and not for myself, that I try to inquire of the word and the speaking subject." (p. 465) Elsewhere he presses the point even more vigorously: "It is rather a question of our being gripped by the subject-matter —not gripped physically, not making an experience of it and the like, although (ironically) that can happen— but really gripped, so that it is only as those who are mastered by the subject matter, who are subdued by it, that we can investigate the humanity of the word by which it is told us." We now can understand what Barth means when he says that the Bible is the Word of God to the Church and for the Church.

There is another remarkable section on the necessity of understanding the Bible historically, a demand which carries weight since Barth has a knowledge of historical criticism and form criticism. He recognizes the presence of saga and legend in the Old Testament, he sees very clearly the precariousness of many historical elements in the Old Testament, and not least of all the fallibility of the biblical writers, in matters of fact and world view as well as in theology. The "vulnerability of the Bible, i.e., its capacity for error, also extends to its religious or theological interest." (p. 509) Barth's recognition of the historical task could scarcely be better stated than his description of the contents of the Bible as "the human speech uttered by specific men at specific times in a specific situation, in a specific language, and with a specific intention.' (p. 464) If this is true, then they must be subjected to historical understanding. But historical understanding involves something much deeper than that of the critic alone, for after all this is the task of the observer. To be really 'historical' is to be involved in the revelation to which the writers witness. The revelation cannot be subjected to principles or norms, to philosophies or to systematic formulations. We must not abstract from the Bible "some concealed historical or conceptual system, an economy of salvation or a Christian view of things. There can be no biblical theology in this sense, ,either of the Old Testament or of the New Testament, or of the Bible as a whole." (p. 483)

Professor Bennett has commented upon Barth's attitude toward the Canon. Barth is anxious to make it clear that the Church does not determine what is canonical and what is not. The Church has separated and singled out this collection of documents "because they have proved themselves to be singled out and set apart." It only confirms and establishes what has already been formed and given to it. Its decision concerning the limits of the Canon is human, "but we do not obey its judgment" when we accept it. The revelation of the Word of God is antecedent to the Church. The discussion in this section does not seem to me to be entirely satisfactory; we perhaps do better with C. H. Dodd to recognize a reciprocal relation between Church and Word of God, for this better explains the actual historical state of affairs. Yet Barth's stress on the freedom of the individual and of the Church today in relation to the Canon is one of the most liberating parts of his work, especially because it is not a mater of caprice or predilection. He is far from being an authoritarian or legalist. In many ways he is very radical. He is not concerned with establishing a new orthodoxy; on the contrary he is eager that there be constant conversation and polemic on the central issues of the Church's proclamation. He has a genius for examining every facet of a problem, for doing full justice to the position of those with whom he differs, and of extraordinary precision in stating his own views. He

seems prolix at times, but one cannot afford to skip over a page now and then, and least of all the fine print, because here his discussion is often most interesting. His work is theology in the great tradition; he belongs, with Augustine and Luther and Calvin, to the main stream of Christian thinkers; if he does not always seem to speak to our age in the language we should like, he does address himself to the Church and confronts it with the Word of God and the proclamation which it is called to hear.

JAMES MUILENBURG

CHRISTOLOGY AND MYTH IN THE NEW TESTAMENT, BY G. V. JONES. *New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956. 295 pp., $4.50.*

This book presents a contribution to the demythologizing issue, a subject of lively debate ever since the publication of Bultmann's essay, "*Neues Testament und Mythologie.*" The purpose of the author is similar to that of Bultmann: The mythological material in the New Testament must be reinterpreted for contemporary man. "How is the mythological thought-world of the New Testament to be understood? How much of it should be allowed to remain? What is to be the extent of the demything and what principle is to guide it? What is the essential meaning of the New Testament language? What lies behind myth? . . . These are questions which clamour for answers." (p. 21)

The author focuses his attention on the area of Christology, the language of which is mythological. In Part One (Prolegomena) we are taken through a discussion of Bultmann's work on the subject of myth and of the permanent value of mythical thinking for modern man. The author then criticises Bultmann's evaluation of history and eschatology and makes an appeal for a 'Christology of Jesus.'

Part Two (The Problem of the Mythological) introduces the mythological form of the Christology of the Epistles. A possible interpretation as a method of demythologizing is presented in the thought of L. Thornton and K. Heim.

Part Three (*Kurios Christos*) forms the main part of the book. The methodology of the author becomes clear: Analogical thought provides a non-mythological interpretation of *Kurios*. The notions of emergent evolution represented in the philosophy of Alexander and of historical-religious culmination as outlined by A. T. Cadoux are found wanting. Lordship must be seen as perfect Sonship. Chapters on the Lordship of Christ over creation and his position within the created series follow, illuminated by analogical "illustrations" from the scientific and aesthetic disciplines.

Part Four (The Myth as Logos) discusses finally the permanent value of myth in the light of observations made by K. Mannheim, Cassirer, Jung, Urban, and A. J. Toynbee.

As one may gather from the content, the book is difficult to review. For its intent is important, whereas the execution of this intent raises numerous questions, especially since the author deals with just about all possible fields of learning, ranging from aestheticism to modern physics—and this often in an involved, obscure style. The title of the book and Dr. Wilder's introductory statement on the cover are both misleading. The title should have omitted "in the New Testament" since it uses the New Testament more as a springboard for general apologetic-philosophical purposes, rather than dealing specifically with the problem of Christology in the New Testament. For this reason this reviewer cannot agree with Dr. Wilder that it "clarifies the whole problem of New Testament 'mythology'." The execution of Mr. Jones' program is not easy to follow. Throughout the opening chapters of the book one is wondering where Mr. Jones is going

and exactly what his purpose is. This is caused by the misleading title and by the fact that the author's understanding of myth remains undefined until the last chapter of the book. Furthermore, a clear statement on methodology is absent in the preface to the book. The methodology finally adopted is that of analogy. This means the investigation of the nature and meaning of mythological thought in all possible scientific realms. We are led through discussions on Russian sophiology, medicine, Jungian archetypes, hormic vitalism, Berdyaev's creative act, etc., in order to interpret the permanent meaning of myth. Although the author's intent of establishing a common discourse between theology and science in this matter must be appreciated, one wonders whether this methodology of analogy is valid. At least, should not the question arise whether theology has not a proper methodology of its own which cannot be easily correlated with that of the sciences? In discussing the uniqueness of Christ, e.g., is it a great help to the *theological* meaning of this uniqueness to compare it with the creative impulse manifested in a work of art along the lines of Berdyaev's primary creative impulse and to come to the conclusion that "Jesus in this sense can be thought of as the creative impulse of God continuous in human experience?"

Even if this theological disagreement be invalid, the author speaks at times to an exceedingly sophisticated circle when he supposes that the complex thought of L. Thornton, Whitehead, Alexander, and Morgan can be dealt with intelligibly in two or three pages. The suspicion arises that this is an encyclopaedic survey of mythology, which *also* discusses the New Testament. Yet it should be emphasized that the problems raised about the translation of mythological statements are often incisive and suggestive, e.g., the search for the normative-objective value of myth and the problem of the exact signifiance of 'cosmic salvation.' Furthermore, a just criticism is raised against Bultmann's scepticism with respect to the historical Jesus. The insistence that only a 'Christology of Jesus' can be the basis for a New Testament Christology is an important hypothesis, but it is another matter whether it can be sufficiently demonstrated on the basis of the synoptic materials, especially since the author uses the disputed Mt 11^{25}f. Logion repeatedly as an authentic utterance of the historical Jesus and argues that the Johannine sayings with respect to the intimacy of Father and Son are an elaboration of the Mt 11^{25} f. Logion! (cf. pp. 90, 123, 142 f.)

Although the author understands Bultmann's program correctly as a reinterpretation of myth rather than its elimination, the frequent use of the term 'demything' erroneously suggests that no logos or reinterpretation is involved in demythologizing. Mr. Jones considers Bultmann's treatment of myth to be too subjective-anthropological; he points out that the obsolete New Testament cosmology can be detached from the theological framework without any serious loss to the latter. But can one use Bultmann as a 'springboard' (p. 10) without giving him his proper due? To state that existentialism is "as good a philosophy as any for supplying terms for the reinterpretation of New Testament mythological thought" (p. 9) denies the proximity of the thrust of this philosophy to Biblical thought. Futhermore, can one omit a discussion of Bultmann's '*existential*' method and deny its importance for myth (p. 56) in a discussion of Bultmann and mythology? For the existential method is related to the hermeneutical problem; and the hermeneutical problem, rather than the mythological, as such, is the *central* focus of Bultmann's thought. In conclusion, then, I wonder to what extent Mr. Jones has clarified for us either Bultmann or the mythology of the New Testament.

J. Christiaan Beker

THE PAULINE VIEW OF MAN, BY W. DAVID STACEY. *New York, St. Martin's Press, 1956. xv-253 pp., $5.75.*

This book raises again the question of whether Paul's theology was influenced primarily by Jewish or Greek thought, and seeks the answer in an appraisal of Paul's use of anthropological terms. The conclusion which the author reaches is that Paul is, first and foremost, neither Jew nor Greek but Christian. It was his encounter with the Risen Christ that provided the real impetus to his thought. Naturally that thought was couched in words and concepts that were familiar to Paul and to his contemporaries. Paul's anthropology shows signs of strong Jewish "flavour," a word which the author prefers to "influence." It is natural to assume that his thought would have such a flavour since Paul was a Jew and Jewish thought forms expressed most adequately the ideas which Paul wanted to convey. He does not hesitate, however, to adopt Greek forms when these are appropriate. In both cases he fills the old skins with new wine with the predicted result.

The book is a valuable one in that it provides a careful and readable summary of the literature dealing with the topic of the Jewish and Greek influences on Paul. It presents a useful outline of Greek and Jewish anthropology, as well as detailed analysis of the terms used by Paul. In other words the author does an excellent job of setting the stage for his discussion.

The question of Pauline anthropology may seem somewhat academic until one remembers that for Paul, as for any Jew and equally for any Christian, anthropology is always theological. To ask the question "What is man?" is also to ask "How is he related to God?" For the preacher and teacher the book can raise again the question of how the Christian message is to be interpreted to a world largely influenced by Greek modes of thought. It is often disconcerting to the modern Western Christian to learn that the Bible does not teach the immortality of the soul.

From the scholarly point of view the author raises one point which may well call forth further study. He challenges W. D. Davies' assertion that Paul's thought is influenced by Rabbinic theology. On the contrary he asserts that, while its main source is certainly Hebraic and not Greek, it is Hebraism of the Old Testament and not of the Rabbis.

The value of this book lies in its lucid and readable summary of the results of scholarship on an important question.

RICHARD REID

THE MINISTRY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, EDITED BY H. RICHARD NIEBUHR AND DANIEL D. WILLIAMS. *New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956. xiv-331 pp. $5.00.*

The pioneers who settled our western wilderness moved forward irregularly, venturing ahead in certain regions while others remained scarcely touched. So the eight pioneers who have explored the surprisingly neglected subject of the Christian ministry in its historical development do not advance in solid front, but seek to chart trails which one day may be broadened into highways of understanding. They have written not a history of the ministry, but a series of extremely able and informative essays which open up certain important segments of that history and which break ground for later cultivation.

This work is a pioneering venture in another way. It is frequently observed that symposiums are uneven and unsatisfactory, often perhaps because the authors have not had face to face con-

sultations and agreed on the central foci and major divisions of the work. But this book was planned in group discussion, outlines were reviewed as they were developed, and first drafts of chapters were circulated for criticism. At the same time, each author was left free to shape his own contribution in terms of the material for which he was responsible and in accordance with his own understanding of the topic. Indeed, one of the aims of this collaborative effort was to present a variety of viewpoints on the meaning of the historical developments traced. Therefore this is something of a model as to one way in which cooperative scholarship can be fruitful without the shackling of competent men. "The Ministry in the Primitive Church" is treated by John Knox of Union; his precise and compact essay greatly clarifies what will always be a complex and partially veiled area. George Williams of Harvard provides two chapters in covering the period from about 125 to 450; he combines useful and closely-written summaries with brief but informative treatments of Church Fathers whose influence on the history of the ministry down the centuries has been great. Roland Bainton of Yale speaks in broad and general terms in seeking to cover the vast span of the middle ages. Wilhelm Pauck of Union focuses his lively discussion on the central importance of preaching for the ministry in the time of the Reformation: "Only the new understanding of the gospel achieved by Luther and his fellow Reformers led to such an emphasis upon the proclamation of the Word that henceforth the very reality of the church was grounded in preaching." (p. 110)

Edward Hardy of Berkeley Divinity School and Winthrop Hudson of Colgate-Rochester deal respectively with "Priestly Ministries in the Modern Church" and "The Ministry in the Puritan Age." Both make extensive use of a writing of George Herbert in their illuminating essays; Dr. Hardy refers to it as *A Priest to the Temple: or the Country Parson*, while Dr. Hudson prefers the simpler form, *The Country Parson*. The tension between Anglican and Puritan—though they were so alike in many ways, as Professor Hudson makes clear—is thus rather neatly illustrated! Professor Hardy's chapter comes down to the present; it is pointed out, for example, that the modern clerical collar (apparently "Anglican" rather than "Roman") and the first modern Anglican monastic community both date from about 1865. Dr. Hudson's chapter does not move past 1660, but in its emphasis on the "painful" preaching of the Puritan period it relates Dr. Pauck's contribution to the chapter on "The Rise of the Evangelical Conception of the Ministry in America (1607-1850)" by Sidney Mead of Chicago.

As the book approaches the present it focuses almost wholly on the United States, not at all unsuitable in a work which is the second of the publications by "The Survey of Theological Education in the United States and Canada." In carrying the story from early seventeenth to middle nineteenth centuries, Dr. Mead analyzes the "evangelical" conception of the role of the minister which minimizes the sacerdotal aspects and emphasizes the charismatic ones. He traces the way whereby "something which had always been represented in Christianity by a minority voice gained the dominant voice in America by around 1850—but perhaps in the perspective of history only temporarily so." (p. 219) Robert Michaelsen of Iowa brings the account to date, emphasizing the increasing complexity of the ministry in an age of revolutionary character. In an effort "to discern some pattern in exceedingly complex developments almost too close to the mind's eye to be viewed in proper focus" (p. 252), Dean Michaelsen elaborates more than a dozen types of ministers, and discusses some of the consequences of this variety.

One concrete outcome of this pioneering volume ought to be the stimulation

of much more research and writing in this field. The histories of the ministry in Eastern Orthodoxy, in Roman Catholicism, in the various European communions, and in the Younger Churches now press for attention; historical treatments of the ecumenical debates about the nature and functions of the ministry are also very much in order. But though complementary and much more detailed studies are clearly called for—the role of the pioneer is to lead the way!—it will be a long time before this work itself is replaced, for it stands out as a major achievement of ecumenical scholarship and historical interpretation.

ROBERT T. HANDY

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR IN THE AGE OF THE REFORMATION, BY E. HARRIS HARBISON. *New York, Scribners, 1956. xii-177 pp, $3.00.*

This book represents the Stone lectures which the author delivered at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1955. The individual chapters were prepared evidently with the anticipation that they were to be read as lectures. Though very substantial, they are marked by a certain informal freshness that is fitting for the lecture room. Because of this character, it is quite difficult to give a comprehensive impression of them and to judge them in the form of a review. Their content is solid throughout. They reflect a wise and discerning scholarship and that mature understanding of men and their times which a responsible historian attains when he has lived and worked with his sources and documents for a long time.

Professor Harbison is fully aware of the many-sidedness of his theme and tries to do justice to it. It is his chief purpose to characterize the Christian scholarship of Erasmus, Luther and Calvin but, in order to do this, he finds it necessary to deal with the problem of Christian scholarship not only in terms of its historical development from the beginning but also in terms of the limits set to it by the Christian Faith. He deals with the first part of this problem by an analysis of the historical character of Christian scholarship from ancient times to the Renaissance. The second part of the problem is kept in mind throughout the lectures. Professor Harbison alludes to it again and again. He is aware of the fact that no one has ever found it necessary to rely on scholarship in order to be or to become a Christian believer. On the other hand, he has a deep appreciation of the accomplishments of Christian scholarship of all ages so far as it tried to understand the development of the Christian tradition, or to relate all or part of its

substance to the cultural life, or to interpret it in terms of the changing standards and fashions of human thought.

In the context of such a complex of questions, the author deals specifically with the close interrelation between faith and scholarship at the time of the Reformation. He offers sketches of the mind and work of the major Reformers and these sketches are sharply and skillfully drawn. They are portraits that are true to life and worthy of long and repeated study. Indeed, they are done so skillfully that when a reader has done with one of them, he is led to think that the character portrayed must be Professor Harbison's favorite. But, as a matter of fact, he does not allow himself any favoritism. He wants to do as much justice to Luther or Calvin as to Erasmus and Colet. In each case he writes from a critical knowledge of the primary sources and of secondary literature, giving close attention to detail without losing sight of the whole.

The lectures should be read again and again. They represent historical scholarship at its best.

WILHELM PAUCK

FAITH, REASON, AND EXISTENSE, BY JOHN A. HUTCHISON. *New York, Oxford University Press, 1956. xi-306 pp., $4.50.*

The right man, the right book, and the right time. For some time we have needed a text-book in the field of the Philosophy of Religion that wasn't written in Chicago or Boston and that has tried to respond to the theological and biblical developments of the last generation. This is an invaluable book. Professor Hutchison of Columbia has enough theology to know the dangers of one over-emphasis, and he has fought recalcitrant philosophy departments long enough to know the dangers of the other over-emphasis.

It is clearly and simply written; it would be useful even for freshmen courses. It defines its terms with precision: indeed the definitions of philosophy, religion, faith and revelation are models of careful religious analysis.

The content of the chapters shows how the author has combined theological and philosophical interests: religious methodology; myth and symbol; the nature of man; faith, revelation and God; rational theology; the meaning of history; science and religion; religion and culture; religion and ethics. These concerns are the subject matter of the book. In each case, the author sets out the issues, describes the alternative positions, takes his stand, and defends it. He is fair with opponents and tentative in his own conclusions, inviting his reader to participate in the struggle for more adequate solutions.

The intellectual climate of the book is pure Morningside Heights. For a Union graduate to read it is to re-live his own struggles with confusion and unbelief. It may be that this represents too narrow a position; there may be intellectual situations where the problems will be posed differently. But the particular theological position of this book has real strengths too. It may serve to persuade some of the ecstatic extremists in biblical theology that philosophical precision need not become involved in the sin of pride.

I would like to make three suggestions for expansion in the second edition (this book will be widely used, and a series of editions is to be expected). 1) The admirable section on myth really should include a discussion of the problems raised by Prof. Bultmann. 2) The section on science and religion might well include reference to the increasingly important discussion concerning the Christian origins of

the rise of modern science. This is the point made by Michael Foster, and later John Baillie, about the role of the Christian doctrine of creation in the rise of science in the 16th century. And finally, 3), the section on the problem of evil is much too brief. Surely this represents one of the most important intellectual obstacles to Christian belief today. The theological position which Prof. Hutchison represents has not really faced this issue squarely, and to say by way of conclusion that Christ is Victor over evil and suffering is not good enough.

There is a fine section on the significance of the rational proofs for God's existence, and an excellent analysis of the challenge of logical empiricism to theology. This final problem is going to become an acute one on our campuses as positivism begins to displace existentialism in the philosophy departments. Professor Hutchison's approach is a much-needed one. Altogether this is a first-rate and beautifully-written piece of work.

WILLIAM HAMILTON

THEOLOGY YOU CAN UNDERSTAND, BY RACHEL H. KING. *New York, Morehouse-Gorham Co., 1956. 223 pp., $4.25.*

All kinds of good things come out of the Northfield School for Girls, and Rachel King's *Theology You Can Understand* is far from being an exception. It is a good book because the author deals with *real* theology in a manner which ought to be meaningful to ordinary people. In other words, and this is high praise, the title is accurate. As the dust-jacket says, Miss King provides us with "real theological meat." "And yet the style of the book is anecdotal, with non-technical vocabulary."

Dr. King is well able to accomplish what she set out to do. She has taught high school girls for twenty-five years, and I understand that she teaches them substantial stuff. She has a Ph.D. from Yale in Church History and Doctrine and certainly knows what genuine theology is. She obviously does not dodge difficult problems and doctrines, and yet (this is the marvelous thing about her book) she presents Christian thought in such an attractive and well-written form that ordinary people ought to be encouraged to study further.

Now of course *Theology You Can Understand* is not meant to replace Seeberg's *History of Doctrines* or Tillich's *Systematic Theology*. Although Miss King deals with man's experience of reverent awe, for instance, it is typical of her method that she does not define the autonomous religious consciousness with the technical precision of a Rudolf Otto (for which her readers will no doubt be grateful), but she does tell about Jacob's fear of the Lord, and she quotes from a marvelous poem by Verlaine. She makes her point. The reader will never confuse the fear of the Lord with "the kind of fear that we have of mad dogs." With regard to her discussion of the Trinity, we are not given all the answers in precise detail. After all, high school people do not need to know that Gregory of Nyssa uses *ousia* in the sense of Aristotle's *prote ousia*, but they ought to know that "when Christians serve the Father, Son and Holy Ghost they are not subject to three masters, but only one master, as the three lead men in exactly the same direction." The point is made that when you please Jesus you please God, but when you please Athena, Aphrodite might be annoyed. But one also has to do justice to the idea of God as three, and Miss King describes the error of Sabellianism without mentioning the word or other impossible terms: The mask illustration

"tends to suggest that the threeness is not genuine, but is just play acting."

The examples mentioned above do not properly indicate the scope and cohesion of the book. Perhaps this can best be done by mentioning the work's four major divisions: 1) "The Triune God" or "The Outgoing of Love," 2) "Man: His Sin and Salvation" or "The Travail of Love," 3) "The Church Here" or "The Response to Love," 4) "The Church Hereafter" or "The Triumph of Love."

Theology You Can Understand is in accord with recent trends in its emphasis upon the Church, the Ecumenical Movement and eschatology. Not all of the readers will agree with everything said about these and other questions (miracles, for instance), nor will informed readers admit that the Protestant Church "includes about two fifths of all Christians." But I think that most of Miss King's readers will concede that she gives us real theological food for thought.

CHARLES M. NIELSEN

CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHICS, BY ALBERT T. RASMUSSEN. *Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1956. xi-318 pp., $4.00.*

Professor Albert Rasmussen has written a book of great usefulness which reflects his own many-sided training and experience. He combines sociological expertness in the study of communities with deep concern for Christian Ethics and always he has emphasized the theological implications of both. This is a borderline book. It is a book of Christian social ethics in major intention. It is a book of cultural analysis. It is a book of practical theology with much guidance for churches as they deal with the problems of their communities. It is a book of "know how" for "exerting Christian influence" in the light of an informed and realistic account of the obstacles which the churches face. It should be said that the book's subtitle is "Exerting Christian Influence." The whole book is written to answer one question: how can our churches become effective bearers of Christian social ethics in the midst of the present American social and cultural climate?

The author is impressed by the actual weakness of the American churches in their influence upon society. He quotes Henry Steele Commager's words: "Never before have the churches been materially more powerful and spiritually less effective." His own studies of American culture lead him to emphasize the oppressiveness of the moral climate, the ways in which the churches are influenced more than they influence the world around them. Except when he discusses the race problem his emphasis is on the intangible corruptions of the spirit more than on the obvious forms of social injustice which were central in the thought of teachers of social ethics two decades ago. He seeks to avoid both the attitude of self-righteous indignation, on the part of the critics who are themselves involved in the problems, and the attitude of cynical complacency. One of the best things about this book is the author's combination of an almost ruthless realism with a full appreciation of the creative tendencies which he does find in the Churches.

Professor Rasmussen is true to our present condition in emphasizing the making of decisions in situations of perplexity rather than the conducting of crusades for clear Christian objectives. His analysis of the factors that enter into decisions, of the nature of the Christian's necessary compromises, of the problems which arise in coming to a consensus in a group, of the give and take of negotiations, and his discussion of how these factors are re-

lated to Christian faith and Christian ethics are especially illuminating. He puts great emphasis on the conviction that it is in just such difficult decisions that we confront God and that we understand the truth in Christian teaching about man's sin and of his need for forgiveness. Sometimes he writes as though he represented the school of thought which stresses the immediate context of decision at the expense of the universal Christian guidance which may be brought to the context. Actually the book as a whole is very well balanced at this point. He says that this emphasis upon responding to God in the situation "does not mean that a Christian goes into the situation with no principles, no categories, and no memories. Without these he could not understand the situation or respond significantly." (p. 170) In a chapter on the local community he quotes with approval a list of ten criteria by which we should be guided in seeking "a good community." He is also much influenced by the body of social teaching that has been developed in the ecumenical movement.

Professor Rasmussen writes for this decade of Christian social action and he brings to it the prophetic spirit and the sense of urgency which were familiar in earlier decades and which now are often lacking.

JOHN C. BENNETT

IN HIS NAME: PRAYERS FOR THE CHURCH AND THE WORLD, PREPARED BY GEORGE APPLETON. *New York, St. Martin's Press, 1956. xii-191 pp., $3.00.*

This commendable compilation of Scripture passages and prayers grew out of the editor's personal sense of need for a discipline of missionary intercession on behalf of the work of the whole Church, and was undertaken at the encouragement of the secretaries of the International Missionary Council. Its contents, however, range more widely than the avowed one of providing intercessory prayers for the missionary cause. Included are acts of the adoration of God as the "God of All," and of the "God-Man" Christ, as well as acts of confession and personal petition, and of intercessions for the training and work of the ministry, and the life of the domestic churches.

The main chapters of the book are organized under such general themes as have been suggested, and are divided into aspects of each theme. The pattern of material consists of: a) Relevant Scripture passages and texts; b) biddings to acts of prayer related to the subject of the section; c) a series of brief prayers drawn from both traditional and modern sources, combining the best of classical thought and language with the concrete and immediate concerns of our day; d) The Lord's Prayer, used at appropriate points in the sequence.

The freshness of approach, relevance of ideas and themes, and substantial qualities of the materials used, should win for this little volume a wide acceptance among all whose concern for the life and work of the church, at home as well as abroad, is sustained by a commitment to disciplined prayer. Its worth is to be discovered not so much in reading, but in use for both personal and corporate worship.

JOHN L. CASTEEL

BIBLICAL THEOLOGY AND CHRISTIAN EDUCATION, BY RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER. *New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956. 212 pp., $3.50.*

Dr. Miller is teaching a course at Union this semester with the same title as that of this book. His being chosen to "succeed" Dr. Sherrill for the semester indicates the position Randolph Crump Miller holds in Christian education in America.

Biblical Theology and Christian Education is really the last of a trilogy. It is built upon and inevitably follows his *Education for Christian Living* and *The Clue to Christian Education.* This book, however, can stand by itself and as such it shall be judged.

It is Miller's thesis that "there is a language of relationship by which the story of the Bible can become meaningful and relevant to children in an educational situation." He attempts to validate this thesis by selecting five motifs or themes (creation, covenant, Christ, church, and consummation) and applying each of these to the various stages in a person's growth—from nursery through high school. The home, Miller contends, is the ally of the church in this process; the important thing for both parent and teacher to know is the appropriate time to introduce the particular motif into the child's learning experience. One does not, however, introduce the drama of redemption into a person's life at a certain time. This drama is expressed through the language of relationship from birth; the verbal motif (or the language of words) is dependent upon this prior language—hence Miller sees the Bible as the *illuminator* of the relationships of daily living.

In a sense it is correct to say that "when the concern is for the use of words rather than for the creation of relationships, the Church fails in its teaching of Biblical theology," and "the great words of Biblical theology can be taught through this language of relationships." But in another sense, it is not. The use of words is an important aspect of the church's ministry. As the meanings of words are the result of relationships, so the nature of the relationship is determined by the words used in the relationship. The principal dialogue, therefore, should not be between the language of words and the language of relationships, but between Biblical and non-biblical terminology. This entails a hermeneutical principle. The omission of this dialogue is a disappointing feature of Miller's book.

Furthermore, it is difficult to decide who the author assumes his reader will be. Both the pastor and the Christian educator may find the book inadequate for their tasks. His treatment of Biblical theology is a summary of what they have probably read elsewhere; his educational material is scattered throughout the book and may prove to be an inadequate presentation when the reader attempts to relate the drama of the Bible to a particular age group.

The most significant and helpful chapters in his book are the concluding ones: Commitment and Criticism. One can heartily agree that "criticism" should be included in the church school curricula; Miller's insights here are particularly helpful. The book is a valiant attempt to work out a difficult relationship and should provide a needed stimulus to discussion in current religious education.

GUSTAV NELSON

Book Note

HOW TO USE AUDIO-VISUAL MATERIALS, BY JOHN W. BACHMAN. *New York, Association Press, 1956. 60 pp., $1.00.*

It is hard to see how anyone could have compressed a greater amount of factual, helpful, and down-to-earth information in one book than Professor Bachman has included in this little book of the *Leadership Library* series. Sound principles are stated, practical suggestions are made, and sources of further information are cited. The author handles the following topics, among others: "When Are Audio-Visual Materials Useful?," "What Types Can Be Used?," "How to Use them Effectively," "How to Plan for Others to Use Them." He provides a skillful summary of the wide range of values achievable with the imaginative use of audio-visual materials. He gives in this book a highly useful starting point for pastor and educator.

ROBERT F. BEACH

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